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ABSTRACT
In the event of a chemical terrorist attack on a transportation hub, post-event
remediation and restoration activities necessary to attain unrestricted facility re-use
and re-entry could require hours to multiple days. While timeframes are dependent
on numerous variables, a primary controlling factor is the level of pre-planning
and decision-making completed prior to chemical release. What follows is the sec-
ond of a two-part analysis identifying key considerations, critical information and
decision criteria to facilitate post-attack and post-decontamination consequence
management activities. Decision criteria analysis presented here provides ﬁrst-time,
open-literature documentation of multi-pathway, health-based remediation expo-
sure guidelines for selected toxic industrial compounds, chemical warfare agents,
and agent degradation products for pre-planning application in anticipation of a
chemical terrorist attack. Guideline values are provided for inhalation and direct
ocular vapor exposure routes as well as percutaneous vapor, surface contact, and in-
gestion. Target populations include various employees as well as transit passengers.
Received 17 July 2010; accepted 20 July 2010.
Current addresses: Linda Hall, ENVIRON International Corporation, Marketplace Tower,
6001 Shellmound St., Emeryville, CA 94608, USA; Adam H. Love, Johnson Wright Inc., 3730
Mt. Diablo Blvd., Lafayette, CA 94549, USA.
TheviewsexpressedinthisarticledonotnecessarilyrepresentofﬁcialFederalagencyposition
or policy. Mention of trade names or commercial products does not constitute endorsement
or recommendation of use.
Address correspondence to Annetta Watson, Toxicology and Hazard Assessment, Environ-
mental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 545 Oak Ridge Turnpike, Oak
Ridge, TN 37830, USA. E-mail: watsonap@ornl.gov
57A. Watson et al.
This work has been performed as a national case study conducted in partnership
with the Los Angeles International Airport and The Bradley International Termi-
nal. All recommended guidelines have been selected for consistency with airport
scenario release parameters of a one-time, short-duration, ﬁnite airborne release
from a single source followed by compound-speciﬁc decontamination.
Key Words: chemical warfare agents, CWA, TIC, terrorism, clearance guidelines
and goals, risk assessment, decision criteria.
INTRODUCTION
This analysis describes a speciﬁc one-time, short-duration, chemical airborne
release attack scenario at a major U.S. airport as a mechanism to demonstrate
key considerations and decision criteria that can facilitate post-attack and post-
decontamination consequence management activities. This work reﬂects informa-
tion and lessons learned as part of an ongoing U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) domestic preparedness activity, the Chemical Restoration Opera-
tional Technology Demonstration Project. A primary objective of this analysis is to
provide and document information for chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and toxic
industrial compounds (TICs) appropriate and useful to airport facility remediation
should such an incident occur.
This work is presented in two parts: Part I (“Key assessment considerations”)
(Watson et al. 2011, this issue) characterized the airborne release chemical attack
scenario at a major U.S. airport that serves as the basis of the evaluation. Scenario
assumptions were described, chemicals and populations of concern were character-
ized, various post-event phases and timelines were summarized, a conceptual site
model (CSM) to characterize potential health risks of concern was derived, and
precedents and resources were evaluated. The current analysis, which represents
Part II (“Decision criteria for multipathway exposure routes”), provides ﬁrst-time,
open-literature documentation of multi-pathway and health-based pre-planning re-
mediation exposure guidelines for CWA and TICs, as well as degradation products,
for application in anticipation of a chemical terrorist attack.
BACKGROUND
Detailed project background was provided in Part I of this analysis (Watson et al.
2011, this issue) and is only brieﬂy summarized here. The DHS, and speciﬁcally the
DHS Chemical and Biological Countermeasures Program, has been given respon-
sibility to improve domestic preparedness for potential chemical terrorist release
incidents at key U.S. transportation nodes. Focus of this Project has been on the
Consequence Management phase (e.g., restoration and recovery) of the response;
speciﬁcally, effort is directed to pre-plan the recovery process, select “best available”
methods and technologies for each recovery activity, and address both data and
technology gaps critical to the recovery process. It is recognized that minimizing
potential health and economic impacts from chemical attacks is an effective coun-
termeasure to chemical terrorism.
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As part of a multi-year research program involving several national laboratories
as well as subject matter experts from various state and Federal agencies, the current
analysis presents and documents human health–based exposure guidelines for use
as an aid to site-speciﬁc pre-planning and preparedness for a chemical terrorist in-
cident. This subject area has been under investigation and development during the
current work, in which project participants partnered with the Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport (LAX; Los Angeles, CA) to generate a national case study. While the
followingexposureguidelinesanalysisisnecessarilysite-speciﬁcforasingleterminal
at LAX, many factors common to any restoration operation have been evaluated;
results are thus also applicable to other transportation nodes considered vulnerable
to chemical terrorist attack.
Airport scenario compounds evaluated include the chemical warfare agent
(CWA) nerve agents tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), cyclosarin (GF), and
VX as well as the vesicant agent sulfur mustard (HD); and the toxic industrial
compounds (TICs) phosgene (CG), hydrogen cyanide (AC), and cyanogen chlo-
ride (CK). Exposure pathways analyzed include a variety of routes associated with
airborne vapors (inhalation and direct ocular vapor, percutaneous vapor) and po-
tential surface residues (surface contact with skin, hand-to-eye transfers, hand-to-
mouth ingestion, resuspension inhalation). Populations considered include specif-
ically trained decontamination personnel, transit passengers, and various airport
personnel including restoration and recovery personnel performing refurbishment
tasks, vendors, gate agents, baggage handlers, and others. Population characteris-
tics, elements of the consequence management analysis, and speciﬁc properties for
chemicals of concern and their degradation products are detailed in Watson et al.
(2011, this issue).
Anoverallprojectobjectivehasbeentoleverageexistingresourcesandguidance.
As a consequence, emphasis has been placed on exposure guidelines consistent with
parameters of the site-speciﬁc and one-time release scenario for which this project is
designed. In addition, programmatic focus is maintained on guidelines that already
exist, are published and accessible to the public, have undergone credible peer and
public review, are health-based and protective, are compound-speciﬁc, and have
demonstrated utility in use and practice. Airport stakeholders have made it clear
that, if a chemical terrorist incident should occur tomorrow, it is important to have
an available set of appropriate and reasonable clearance goals from which to begin.
It is understood and acknowledged that each release event will involve site- and
incident-speciﬁc parameters requiring in-context evaluation regarding guideline
applicability.
This article does not address public health responses (i.e., medical treatment) or
risk management elements.
CURRENT EXPOSURE AND EQUIPMENT GUIDELINES
FOR DECONTAMINATION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL
Personal protective equipment and clothing (PPE) selection requirements and
related information for emergency response and decontamination personnel (the
latter entering the facility to collect characterization or clearance samples, install
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decontamination equipment, and perform related tasks) are summarized by the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) (NIOSH/CDC
2008; see: www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/ershdb/ for links to Emergency Response Cards
for individual compounds of concern and compound categories). This information
is provided as the NIOSH Emergency Response Safety and Health Database (ERSH-
DB; www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/ershdb/about.html). Categories of PPE protection (e.g.,
Level A–D, with A [Red Zone] providing the greatest level of protection and D
[GreenZone]providingtheleast)aredeﬁnedonthebasisofwhetherornotidentity
of the hazardous material is known, as well as atmospheric concentrations relative to
exposure limits such as Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL) concentrations. As
the NIOSH guidelines are subject to change, the user is advised to conﬁrm the PPE
and exposure guideline values posted on the NIOSH sites provided above before
ﬁeld application.
The DHS has also adopted science and technology standards developed by
NIOSH or the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) for personal protective
gear for ﬁrst responders (DHS 2006). These chemical response standards specify
technical requirements for respirators and clothing.
In addition, the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards and NIOSH emer-
gency response cards (NIOSH 2005a,b; NIOSH 2008a,b; www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/)
provide respirator and skin protection recommendations for hydrogen cyanide,
cyanogen chloride, and phosgene developed either by NIOSH alone or collabo-
ratively with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). More
speciﬁc recommendations for nonrespiratory chemical protective clothing (boots,
gloves, and suits) are available via a link from the NIOSH website (Mansdorf 1998;
www.cdc.gov/niosh/ncpc/ncpc1.html). Whereas the NIOSH Pocket Guide recom-
mendations have been developed for application to industrial workplaces where
personnelcanberoutinelyexposedduringmanufactureandprocessingandrelated
industrial activities, many consider these occupational values to be important when
considering exposure guidance for decontamination personnel potentially exposed
to hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, or phosgene in the course of their special-
ized duties. The immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) concentrations
are particularly relevant.
PERCUTANEOUS VAPOR EXPOSURE TO CWAs
Intheeventofdamageorbreachtoskin-protectiveclothing,toxicologicallysignif-
icant vapor contact exposure to skin could be possible in high-vapor concentration
situations potentially encountered during emergency response and decontamina-
tion activities associated with a CWA attack. Percutaneous vapor concentrations nec-
essary to produce adverse effects similar to those induced following inhalation or
ocular vapor exposure to these same compounds are often greater by several orders
of magnitude due to skin barrier effects (NRC/COT 2003). The U.S. Army Ofﬁce
of the Surgeon General (OTSG) has established emergency military guidelines for
percutaneous vapor exposure to allow safe exit from a CWA atmosphere in the event
of damage or breach to skin-protective clothing worn by specialized personnel with
CWA expertise and under military management, such as personnel employed in
military munition demilitarization facilities (DA 2004, 2005a) (Table 1). It is noted
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Table 1. Percutaneous vapor exposure guidelines for (military) CWA personnel
escape from selected CWA and TIC atmospheres, assuming respiratory
protection.
a
Example CWA personnel escape guidelines (mg/m3)
for 30-minute percutaneous exposure
(with respiratory protection only, or a breach
CWA or TIC in skin-protective clothing)
Tabun (GA) 11.1a,b
Sarin (GB) 6.0a
Soman (GD) and Cyclosarin (GF) 1.5a,b
VX 0.13a,b
Sulfur mustard (H/HD) 0.1a,b
Hydrogen cyanide (AC) Not determined by NIOSHc
Cyanogen chloride (CK) Not determined by NIOSHc
Phosgene (CG) Not determined by NIOSHc
aDA (2004); Watson et al. (2003).
bMilitary guideline established by the Army Ofﬁce of the Surgeon General (see footnote a).
Percutaneous vapor exposure would be a route of concern if personnel wear respiratory
protection but experience a rip or tear in the protective suit, or if personnel are in
mask-only protective ensemble. Agent vapor concentrations of concern for skin-only
exposure are greater than those for vapor exposure to personnel with no respiratory
protection (where fast-acting inhalation and ocular exposure would occur).
cNIOSH (2003).
that application of the guidelines shown in Table 1 assumes that respiratory protec-
tion is in place and fully functional throughout CWA exposures and that individuals
are under monitoring surveillance.
Watson et al. (2003) observed that dose effects arising from cumulative percuta-
neous exposure to the listed CWAs are likely to remain constant for exposures of
approximately 30 min to 2 h. Thus, 30 min was selected as a reasonable duration for
specialized personnel with CWA expertise to undergo percutaneous exposure to the
concentrations provided in Table 1. Furthermore, 30 min is considered sufﬁcient to
allow specialized personnel with fully functional respiratory protection to perform
multiple data collection cycles and to then safely exit from a CWA atmosphere.
Under appropriate PPE and administrative controls, the available U.S. Army Of-
ﬁce of the Surgeon General guidelines for percutaneous vapor exposure (Table 1)
could be reasonably considered for application in safeguarding civilian decontami-
nation personnel.
The relative toxicity of percutaneous vapor exposure versus direct inhala-
tion/ocular exposure has not been clearly established for the TIC compounds of
concern. Neither cyanogen chloride nor phosgene vapors are known to be dermally
absorbed. Existing reports of toxicity for the scenario TICs focus exclusively on in-
halation toxicity since any percutaneous vapor absorption is widely considered to be
a less signiﬁcant source of exposure than vapor inhalation. Although percutaneous
absorption of HCN (agent AC) vapor occurs (the NIOSH short-term exposure limit
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[STEL] for HCN has a skin notation; NIOSH 2003, 2005a), the relative importance
of skin exposure for HCN is not well characterized. Anecdotal human data (ATSDR
2006) for HCN and experimental animal data reviewed by the American Indus-
trial Hygiene Association (AIHA 2007) indicate that markedly higher (greater than
40-fold) concentrations may be required to induce lethality when HCN vapor ex-
posure occurs percutaneously rather than by inhalation. NIOSH has not developed
percutaneous vapor exposure guidelines for cyanogen chloride or phosgene.
INHALATION/OCULAR EXPOSURE GOALS SUITABLE FOR GENERAL
PUBLIC UNDER LAX AIRPORT SCENARIO
As previously documented, the air exposure pathway is a key focus for developing
clearance and re-occupancy goals for the scenario compounds; in addition, the
release scenario hypothesized in this evaluation assumes that a CWA or TIC source
is removed, neutralized or otherwise terminated during the ﬁrst-response phase
and that the absence of further agent release is frequently veriﬁed and validated
under standard protocols for monitoring air and personnel at the site. Because the
average passenger dwell time in the terminal is much less than 8 h (CAM 2005),
the short-term exposure durations assumed here reﬂect actual and measured dwell
times by airline passengers in modern, commercial airport terminals.
For similar reasons, any assumptions of continuous exposure to the chemicals of
concern are rejected as incompatible with expected jobsite conditions for various
airport personnel performing tasks associated with repair, maintenance, replace-
ment or servicing of airport components and facilities; as well as airport employees
(e.g., gate agents, baggage handlers) and vendors. In other words, this description
encompasses all airport personnel performing tasks other than decontamination
of CWAs or TICs. Remediation protocols (Watson et al. 2011, this issue) require
that all of these tasks and services be performed only after obtaining conﬁrmation
that (1) the agent source is removed and/or neutralized, (2) all forensic assess-
ment is completed, (3) any decontamination processes are completed and veriﬁed,
and (4) clearance sampling has characterized atmospheres. The airport response
protocol recommends that any subsequent detection of compounds of concern at
clearance concentrations would result in the prompt exclusion of personnel until
additional remediation occurs. As a result of the protection afforded by source re-
moval, decontamination, and clearance sampling before initiating restoration and
recovery tasks, protective assumptions developed for transit passenger populations
are also considered appropriate for all airport personnel performing tasks other
than decontamination of CWAs or TIC, and vendors. All of the above populations
are considered to be members of the general public.
Ofthemanyoptionsconsidered,thoseshort-termexposureconcentrationsdevel-
oped by the National Research Council Committee on Toxicology (NRC/COT) in
collaboration with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA’s) National
Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for Hazardous
Substances offer several advantages. AEGLs are available for several tiers (1, 2, 3) of
gradually increasing toxic effects and multiple exposure durations, have undergone
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rigorous peer review (including publication in the Federal Register for public com-
ment), and have employed a modern and systematic approach to data analysis in a
manner transparent to the public and other stakeholders (NRC/COT 2001, 2002,
2003). The established review process ensures appropriate scientiﬁc credibility and
peer review. In addition, AEGL values are available for the speciﬁc compounds of
interest and are currently being implemented by local, state, and Federal agencies
in preparation for accidental or intentional releases [Watson et al. (2011, this issue)
discussion of “Precedents and Sources”). Use of these values allows for identiﬁca-
tion of an initial and credible starting point and, depending on the incident- and
site-speciﬁc parameters, can be adjusted accordingly.
Because of their recognized scientiﬁc credibility and expanding uses in domestic
preparedness planning by affected communities as well as Federal and state au-
thorities, this analysis considers the AEGL concentrations as protective, appropriate
and useful for making site-access re-entry determinations for the traveling public,
airport personnel, and vendors. This analysis further considers application of the
mildest effect tier (AEGL-1) (NRC/COT 2001) to be appropriate, and application
of the 8-h AEGL-1 concentrations (the lowest values) as reasonable criteria for all
transit passenger stay times ≤8 h as well as for airport personnel and vendors. Se-
lecting the minimal exposure concentrations developed for assumed 8-h exposure
durations is a highly protective assumption for LAX transit passengers given the
one-time only release scenario and the fact that most passengers spend ≤4hi n
the most heavily used LAX terminals (CAM 2005). It is acknowledged that use of
any given dwell (“stay”) time assumption may be airport-speciﬁc; nevertheless, the
8-h continuous-exposure durations evaluated above are considered protective for
post-decontamination applications.
The values presented in Table 2 provide compound-speciﬁc and protective air
concentrationsforclearancescreeningdecision-making.The“reasonablemaximum
clearance goals” compound-speciﬁc concentrations are for an assumed, continuous-
exposuredurationof8hderivedundertheAEGLderivationprotocolofNRC/COT
(2001).Therefore,thisconcentrationisconsideredprotectivenotonlyforexposure
durationsof8h,butalsoforshorter-termexposuredurationsof<8h.Thisapproach
is precautionary given data documenting that the passenger transit time at LAX is
much less than 8 h (CAM 2005). Clearance goal selection of a vapor concentration
for the unlikely continuous CWA or TIC exposure duration of 8 h is thus considered
highly protective. To address those rare situations where public dwell times may be
>8hb u t<24 h, alternative clearance goals are also provided in Table 2. These
clearance goals are derived in the current analysis from standard time-extrapolation
protocols (NRC/COT 2001), and provide additional ﬂexibility to decision-makers.
TherangeprovidedinTable2representsbothreasonablemaximumandalternative
re-entry screening guidelines.
Limitationsintoxicitydataforcyanogenchloride(Cohrssen2001)andphosgene
have restricted development of short-term exposure concentration guidelines, and
result in absence of some or all ﬁnal AEGL or Emergency Response Planning Guide-
line(ERPG)valuesforthesetwocompounds.Accordingly,thisevaluationdeveloped
protective estimates for phosgene and cyanogen chloride speciﬁcally designed for
application to the LAX scenario. Because the estimates are unique to the present
analysis, a comprehensive explanation of the derivation is provided below and in
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011 63A. Watson et al.
Table 2. Recommended airborne (inhalation, ocular) pre-planning clearance
goals for transit passengers as well as various airport employees and
personnel for selected CWAs and TICs.
a
Reasonable maximum Alternative clearance
clearance goals (mg/m3) goals (mg/m3)
<8-h durationb >8b u t<24-h duration
CWA or TIC exposure exposure
Tabun (GA) < 0.0010c < 0.0003e
Sarin (GB) < 0.0010c < 0.0003e
Soman (GD) and Cyclosarin (GF) < 0.00050c < 0.0002e
VX < 0.000071c < 0.000024e
Sulfur mustard (H/HD) < 0.008c < 0.003e
Hydrogen cyanide (AC) < 1.1d < 0.37e
Cyanogen chloride (CK) < 0.25f < 0.08f
Phosgene (CG) < 0.08g < 0.03g
aChemical formulae: tabun, C5H11N2O2P (NATO code GA); sarin, C4H10FO2P( N A T Oc o d e
GB); soman, C7H16FO2P (NATO code GD); cyclosarin, C7H14FO2P (NATO code GF); VX,
C11H26NO2PS (NATO code VX); sulfur mustard, C4H8Cl2S (NATO code HD); hydrogen
cyanide, HCN (NATO code AC); cyanogen chloride, CNCl (NATO code CK); phosgene,
COCl2 (NATO code CG).
bMay also be used as appropriately protective and health-based vapor screening criteria for
releasing items, equipment, and facilities that have not been exposed to liquid or heavy
aerosol forms of the chemical of concern; these screening criteria would also be useful for
evaluating non-porous items and surfaces that have undergone decontamination. If these
vapor screening criteria are attained, such decontaminated items would not be expected to
pose a vapor exposure hazard (DA 2008, Table C-5).
cNRC/COT (2003).
dNRC/COT (2002).
eProposed >8b u t≤24-h protective estimates presented for use in this analysis are derived by
straight-line extrapolation from the 8-h AEGL-1 values and follow standard protocols
(NRC/COT 2001).
fIn the absence of a previously derived CK exposure guideline comparable to AEGL-1, these
estimates were calculated for use in the current assessment (see text for details of derivation.
and Wood 1997). 8-h estimate is derived from experimental data with straight-line
extrapolation to 24 h. This derivation is considered a reasonable approach given the
absence of published AEGL-1 values for cyanogen chloride.
gIn the absence of a previously derived phosgene (agent CG) exposure guideline
comparable to the AEGL-1, these estimates were calculated for use in the current assessment
(see text for details of derivation). 8-h estimate is derived as 50% of 8-h AEGL-2 for phosgene
(NRC/COT 2002), with straight-line extrapolation to 24 h. This derivation is considered a
reasonable approach given the absence of published AEGL-1 values for phosgene.
footnotes of Table 2. Comparable detailed guideline explanations are not provided
for the remaining CWAs and TICs, given that this material has already been widely
published and is incorporated by reference in this analysis (e.g., NRC/COT 2002,
2003; Watson et al. 2006a,b; Bast and Glass 2009; Young and Bast 2009; others).
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Related Considerations
Inhalation minimal risk levels (MRLs) were also considered in this analysis, but
are only available for sulfur mustard agent HD (the MRL for an “acute-duration”
exposure of ≤14 days is 0.0007 mg HD/m
3; MRL for “intermediate-duration” ex-
posure of 15 to 364 days is 0.00002 mg/m
3) (ATSDR 2003). The acute MRL for
agent HD differs from the minimal re-entry screening guideline for HD in Table
2 by an approximate factor of 4. Given that the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR) assumptions of multiple-day and continuous exposure
duration are not supported by the release and decontamination scenario governing
development of this airport remediation analysis, the extended-release inhalation
MRLs for HD are not further considered as clearance guidance for the airport
scenario.
The Standing Operating Procedure for an ongoing effort by USEPA/National
Homeland Security Research Center to develop emergency reference levels has
been recently published (Young et al. 2009). These levels (Provisional Advisory
Levels; PALs) are being derived for assumed continuous 24-h, 30-d, 90-d, and 2-yr
exposuredurationsforbothinhalationandoralexposureroutesand3tiersofeffect,
with tier 1 being least severe and tier 3 being most severe. As provisional values, PALs
are considered “temporary values that will neither be promulgated, nor be formally
issued as regulatory guidance” (Adeshina et al. 2009). Rather their intent is to “assist
in emergency planning and decision-making,” and for use at the discretion of risk
managers.
The >8hb u t<24 h protective vapor concentration estimates for the CWAs
and TICs in Table 2 have been compared with compound-speciﬁc PALs (Watson
et al. 2007; Glass et al. 2008, 2009; see also www.epa.gov/NHSRC/news/news121208.
html). PAL values for phosgene were recently published in Glass et al. (2009); PAL
values for HCN, the G-series nerve agents, nerve agent VX and sulfur mustard
agent HD are within USEPA review at this writing and are not available for ex-
amination unless speciﬁcally requested (www.epa.gov/NHSRC/news/ news121208.
html).
For the lowest effect level (PAL 1) and 24 h exposure duration to the public,
the PAL 1 vapor concentrations for the G-agents are similar to the >8hb u t<
24 h protective estimates in Table 2. The draft nerve agent PAL vapor estimates
have undergone extensive review and have been approved as scientiﬁcally sound by
the PAL Advisory Panel for internal USEPA use, although they have not yet been
released for public access or use as of August 2010. Internal analysis during the
current evaluation has noted close similarity between compound-speciﬁc LAX pre-
planning clearance goals (Table 2) for >8hb u t<24 h, and both G-agent and nerve
agent VX 24-h PAL 1 values for inhalation/ocular exposure. The draft 24-h PAL
1 values for sulfur mustard, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide differ slightly from
the compound-speciﬁc LAX remediation guidance protective estimate for >8hb u t
<24 h (Table 2). At present (August 2010), no 24-h PAL 1 vapor exposure estimates
are available for cyanogen chloride due to sparse data. When PAL values are made
broadly available in a manner that facilitates transparent examination by state and
local regulatory authorities and members of the general public, they can be more
readily provided to decision-makers for further consideration.
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Derivation of Airport Inhalation/Ocular Exposure Guidelines
Guideline level basis for chemical warfare agents
The NRC/COT (2001) describes and documents selection protocols for crit-
ical effects and studies, AEGL derivation, time scaling, use and selection of un-
certainty and modifying factors, and a description of the lengthy and deliberative
review process employed. This material is also available in recent papers by Krewski
et al. (2004) and Watson et al. (2006a,b). Because exposure–response data are usu-
ally not available for each AEGL-speciﬁc exposure duration (for any hazardous
chemical and not just CWAs; NRC/COT 2001), temporal extrapolation is employed
in the development of AEGL values for some AEGL-speciﬁc time periods. The
concentration-exposure time relation for many systemically acting vapors and gases
may be described by C
n × t = k, where the exponent n ranges from 0.8 to 3.5 (C
is concentration in mg/m
3 and t is exposure duration time; Ten Berge et al. 1986).
Haber’s rule (C × t = k) is a special case of this principle, and occurs when n =
1; Haber’s rule has often been used for short-term exposure predictions involving
a small set of highly toxic gases (NRC/COT 2001). For larger sets, and structurally
heterogeneous compounds, the more general relation of C
n × t = k applies (Ten
Berge et al. 1986; NRC/COT 2001).
In general, toxicity data from human studies are preferred for AEGL develop-
ment over those obtained from animal studies (NRC/COT 2001). Furthermore,
vapor exposure data are preferred over those available from alternate exposure
pathways (NRC/COT 2001). Human studies evaluated in the AEGL process must
meet rigorous ethical criteria for acceptance of human subject data in that (1)
subjects should provide informed consent, and (2) there is evidence that human
studies were performed under appropriate clinical supervision (NRC/COT, 2001).
Final AEGL values for nerve agents and sulfur mustard are published in NRC/COT
(2003), while ﬁnal values for phosgene and hydrogen cyanide are published in
NRC/COT (2002). AEGL values for cyanogen chloride have never been ﬁnalized
due to scarcity of data.
When available, AEGL-1 values for the 8 h continuous exposure duration (the
longest duration considered in the AEGL process, and consequently associated
with the smallest AEGL exposure concentration) are incorporated into the LAX
remediation guidance as reasonable maximum re-entry screening guidelines for all
the reasons outlined earlier. Application of standard time-extrapolation protocols
(NRC/COT2001)providesadditionalﬂexibilityinestimatinganalternativere-entry
screening guideline for rare instances when potential exposure durations could be
>8hb u t<24 h. A summary of compound-speciﬁc derivation follows.
AEGL-1 derivation for sarin and other nerve agents. The toxicological database for
agent GB is robust and includes sufﬁcient human and animal data for derivation of
AEGL-1 and AEGL-2 estimates as well as ample laboratory animal lethality data for
directly deriving AEGL-3 values. AEGL-1 values for agent GB were derived from a
well-conducted study on adult female Sprague-Dawley (SD) rats subjected to whole-
bodyexposuresinadynamicairﬂowchambertoarangeofGBvaporconcentrations
(0.01 to 0.48 mg/m
3) for exposure durations of 10, 60, or 240 min (Mioduszewski
et al. 2002a,b). The endpoint of interest and point of departure was the well-deﬁned
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medianeffectiveconcentration(EC50)forreversibleandtransientmiosisinasuscep-
tible gender (female; Dabisch et al.2 0 0 8 a , b ) ;t h i sd e g r e eo fm i o s i si sn o tc o n s i d e r e d
adverse in humans (NRC/COT 2003) and is a direct, local, and transient effect to
the ocular iris.
Of the 283 GB-exposed rats, 142 were female and 141 were male. With the
inclusion of range-ﬁnding experiments and controls, a total of 423 rats was tested in
the well-conducted study of Mioduszewski et al. (2002a,b), which employed highly
credible protocols for GB vapor generation and measurement. Analysis of pre- and
post-exposure rat pupil diameters allowed determination of EC50 values for miosis
(deﬁned by Mioduszewski and his colleagues as a post-exposure pupil diameter of
50% or less of the pre-exposure diameter in 50% of the exposed population). Blood
samples collected from tail vein and heart at 60 min and 7 d post-exposure indicated
no signiﬁcant change from pre-exposure baseline in monitored blood RBC-ChE
(red blood cell cholinesterase), BuChE (butylcholinesterase), or carboxylesterase
activity. No other clinical signs were evident throughout the duration of the study.
Thus, the potential for systemic absorption was evaluated, and did not occur. These
results further document the fact that miosis alone, and in the absence of signs such
as cholinesterase or carboxylesterase activity inhibition, is a local effect reﬂecting
an exposure much less than that required to generate a systemic clinical effect.
Gender differences (females more susceptible) were statistically signiﬁcant. The
EC50 for miosis in female SD rats is thus a well-deﬁned transient, reversible, and
nondisabling animal endpoint in a susceptible gender.
An EC50 for miosis is widely considered the ﬁrst measurable change (and ﬁrst no-
ticeable effect, or FNE) by modern and reproducible techniques in the continuum
of response to anticholinesterase compounds, and is comparable to the pupil size
reduction observed in human subjects who enter bright sunlight after time spent
in a dimly lit room. During the (1995) Tokyo Subway Incident of GB release by do-
mestic terrorists, persons experiencing much greater than 50% reduction in pupil
diameter self-rescued and rendered aid to others (Watson et al. 2006a).
Since miosis in the absence of other clinical signs occurs as a direct and local va-
por exposure effect prior to systemic effects such as whole blood acetylcholinsterase
(AChE) activity depression, and is the FNE associated with exposure to low-level
nerve agent vapor concentrations (Dabisch et al. 2008a,b), the NRC/COT (2003)
considered this endpoint to be a highly protective point of departure for prevention
of systemic effects and estimating acceptable inhalation vapor exposure concentra-
tions. The authors agree with this assessment.
When compared to the human data, NRC/COT (2003) determined that miosis
data derived from the Mioduszewski et al. (2002a,b) study on rats are a more reliable
dataset because of the contemporary and multiple analytical techniques employed
for quantifying exposures and measuring miosis, and the experimental protocol
incorporating sufﬁciently large test and control populations. With the additional
knowledge that the EC50 for miosis exhibited by rats in the study of Mioduszewski
et al. (2002a,b) is transient and reversible, the EC50 for miosis in female (susceptible
gender)SDratsiswellsupportedasanappropriateandprotectivepointofdeparture
for estimating AEGL-1 values. Further, the NRC/COT (2003) ascertained that the
miotogenicresponseofmammaleyestoGBvaporexposureissimilaracrossmultiple
mammal species, including standard laboratory species (rats, rabbits, and guinea
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pigs; Mioduszewski et al., 2002a,b; Callaway and Dirnhuber 1971; Van Helden et al.
2001, 2002), nonhuman primates (marmosets; Van Helden et al. 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004), and humans (Harvey 1952; Johns 1952). As a consequence, the interspecies
uncertaintyfactor(UFA)forthecriticalAEGL-1endpointofEC50 miosisisequalto1.
To accommodate known variation in human cholinesterase and carboxylesterase
activity that may make some individuals susceptible to the effects of cholinesterase
inhibitors, such as nerve agents, the intraspecies uncertainty factor (UFH)w a ss e t
to 10. A modifying factor was not considered applicable. Thus, the total uncertainty
factor for estimating AEGL-1 values for agent GB is 10 (NRC/COT 2003; Watson
et al. 2006a).
In accordance with standard techniques and procedures (NRC/COT 2001; Ten
Berge et al. 1986), the temporal extrapolation used in estimating AEGL values for
GB is based in part on a log–log linear regression of female SD rat miosis data
following GB vapor exposures (Mioduszewski et al. 2002a,b). Regression analysis of
the miosis data yields an n value of 2.00 (NRC/COT 2003). The experimentally
derived n = 2 from the Mioduszewski et al. (2000, 2001, 2002a,b) rat miosis dataset
has been used as the scaling function for nerve agent AEGL derivations.
AEGL-1 values for other G-agents and agent VX were derived from those of agent
GBbyarelativepotencyprotocol(NRC/COT2003;Mioduszewskietal.1998;Watson
et al. 2006a,b). This is considered a toxicologically acceptable approach given that
all mammalian toxicity end points observed in the nerve agent dataset represent
different points on the response continuum for anticholinesterase effects and that
the principal mechanism of mammalian toxicity for the G-agents and agent VX is
cholinesterase activity inhibition. As a consequence, target organ effects are consid-
ered identical, but different in magnitude. Furthermore, NRC/COT determined
that there are no uncertainties for these nerve agents regarding toxic endpoints
such as reproductive or developmental effects or carcinogenicity.
Recently published experimental data for GB vapor exposure in nonhuman pri-
mates, G-agents in swine, and rats exposed to VX further document the highly
protective nature of these recommended clearance values (Genovese et al. 2008,
2009; Dabisch et al. 2008a,b; Whalley et al. 2004, 2007).
AEGL-1 derivation for sulfur mustard. Effects observed at low vapor concentrations
of sulfur mustard are minimal, primarily ocular; and include conjunctivitis, photo-
phobia,andocularirritation;theseeffectsaretransient,nondisabling,andreversible
upon cessation of exposure. The eye is considered the most sensitive and rapidly
responding target tissue to sulfur mustard vapor, and the conjunctival endpoint is
a direct and local vapor exposure effect to the ocular tissues. As such, and given
that this mild ocular tissue response represents ﬁrst noticeable effects (FNE), this
endpoint is considered by NRC/COT (2003) as a protective point of departure for
estimating acceptable respiratory exposure concentrations and AEGL-1 values. This
ocular FNE develops prior to manifestation of any respiratory or further systemic
effectsresultingfrominhalationexposuretosulfurmustardvapor(NRC/COT2003;
Young and Bast 2009).
Available ocular studies include controlled exposures to human volunteers as
well as characterizations of war casualties and occupational exposures. Of these,
only the controlled laboratory studies are suitable for use in deriving AEGL-1 values.
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The human-subject studies by Reed (1918), Reed et al. (1918), Walker et al. (1928),
Guild et al. (1941), and Anderson (1942) provide useful information for assessing
minimal adverse effect levels, and are described below.
ThehumansubjectdataofAnderson(1942)characterizeoculareffectsunderhot
weather conditions when various parameters (high skin temperature and presence
ofmoistureleadingtoanelevatedsulfurmustardreactionrate)combinetoenhance
the alkylating action of sulfur mustard vapor to exposed epithelial tissues. The
Anderson (1942) dataset thus represents a “worst-case” exposure scenario. Under
temperate weather conditions, ocular effects following vapor exposure would occur
at higher sulfur mustard vapor concentrations. Thus, derivation of AEGL estimates
for sulfur mustard from the Anderson (1942) data provides a protective estimate for
exposures that may occur under typical ambient conditions.
Anderson (1942) reported no effects at a sulfur mustard cumulative exposure Ct
of 12 mg-min/m
3, whereas 30 mg-min/m
3 represented the upper range for mild
ocular effects of conjunctival swelling and minor discomfort with no functional
decrement. Slightly higher cumulative exposures (e.g., Cts of 34 to 38.1 mg-min/m
3)
werealsowithoutappreciableoculareffects.Thus,theAnderson(1942)humandata
indicate that the ocular response to 30 mg-min/m
3 is consistent with AEGL-1 effects.
Analysis of the exposure–effect values from these human studies further indicates
thatthelower,12mg-min/m
3valuerepresentsadefensibleestimateoftheno-effects
thresholdforoculareffects,andisthusaprotectivepointofdepartureforestimating
an AEGL-1 value.
Use of human data results in an interspecies UF = 1; furthermore, the use of
human-subject data allows application of an intraspecies UF of 3 for protection of
sensitive individuals. The adjustment is considered appropriate for acute exposures
tochemicalswhosemechanismofactionprimarilyinvolvessurfacecontactirritation
of ocular and/or respiratory tract tissue rather than systemic activity that involves
absorption and distribution of the parent chemical or a biotransformation product
to a target tissue. Anderson (1942) noted that there was little variability in the ocular
responses among individual participants.
Analysis of data characterizing similar ocular effects, as reported by Reed (1918),
Reed et al. (1918), Guild et al. (1941), and Anderson (1942), indicate that for
exposure periods up to several hours, the concentration–exposure time relation is
a near-linear function (i.e., Haber’s Law where n = 1f o rC
n × t = k)a ss h o w nb yn
valuesof0.96and1.11forvariousdatasetsconsistentwithAEGL-1effects.Therefore,
anempiricallyderived,chemical-speciﬁcestimateofn =1wasemployed,ratherthan
a default value, in the derivation. Derivation of the exponent (n) utilized human
response data where 75 to 100% of responders showed a mild response that would
be consistent with the deﬁnition of AEGL-1 effects.
Because human subject data collected under hot-weather conditions (resulting
in enhanced toxicity) were employed as the critical effects and points of departure
for sulfur mustard AEGL-1 derivation, the resulting AEGL estimates are consid-
ered highly protective and incorporate small uncertainty (interspecies UF = 1;
intraspecies UF = 3; composite UF = 3) (NRC/COT 2003; Watson et al. 2006a).
Protective nature of CWA guidelines. The selection of direct local effects to the eye
is a protective approach to critical effect determination, especially when the ocular
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effects observed occur in the absence of systemic toxicity signs. Additional protec-
tion is conferred by the knowledge that these endpoints (EC50 for miosis in the
case of nerve agents; mild ocular irritation and conjunctivitis in the case of sulfur
mustard) are transient and reversible (NRC/COT 2003; Watson et al. 2006a). The
NRC does not consider the EC50 for miosis as an adverse effect in humans, and
NRC notes that the level of ocular irritation expressed at the sulfur mustard critical
effect endpoint occurs in the absence of functional decrement (NRC/COT 2003).
Incorporation of various uncertainty factors inherent to the AEGL process results in
an 8-h AEGL-1 concentration that is at least one, and often several, orders of magni-
tude below those concentrations known to generate miosis (nerve agents) or ocular
irritation (sulfur mustard) in humans (Watson et al. 2006a; and Figures 5, 9, and 13
therein).
When further compared against longer-duration data, these endpoints continue
to remain protective. For example, experimental rats exposed to 0.001 mg GB/m
3
(equivalent to the reasonable maximum clearance goal for 8-h exposure duration
as presented in Table 2) for 6 h/d, 5 times/wk over 24 consecutive weeks exhibited
no miosis, no RBC-ChE activity inhibition; and no signs of neuromuscular, GI, res-
piratory, or behavioral effects (Weimer et al. 1979). In the case of sulfur mustard,
dogs exposed to a time-weighted average concentration of 0.03 mg HD/m
3 (with
peaks at 0.1 mg HD/m
3 for 6.5 h/d), 5 d/wk for 8 consecutive weeks exhibited no
ocular or any other agent-related effects (McNamara et al. 1975). The experimental
time-weighted concentration of 0.03 mg HD/m
3 from McNamara et al. (1975) is
approximately 4 times greater than the reasonable maximum clearance goal pre-
sented in Table 2 (e.g., 0.008 mg HD/m
3), and an order of magnitude greater than
the alternate clearance goal (e.g., 0.003 mg HD/m
3) for HD exposure durations >8
but < 24 h (Table 2).
Guideline level basis for selected toxic industrial compounds (TICs)
Of all TICs evaluated in this assessment, hydrogen cyanide (CAS # 74–90-8)
is the most completely characterized; available values include AEGL 1, 2, and 3
concentrations for all AEGL exposure durations (NRC/COT 2002); Emergency
Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) (AIHA 2007); Integrated Risk Informa-
tion System (IRIS) reference concentration (RfC) and reference dose (RfD) esti-
mates(USEPA/IRIS1993);NIOSHandOSHAindustrialworkplaceexposureguide-
lines (www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg; www.cdc.gov/niosh/ershdb), and others. The HCN
dataset is rich and robust, and includes well-conducted studies of human and non-
human primate subjects as well as standard laboratory species (NRC/COT 2002;
ATSDR 2006). Pre-planning clearance goals for the LAX chemical terrorism release
scenario could thus be developed in a manner similar to that for the CW agents; for
example, selection of the 8 h AEGL 1 concentration (1.1 mg HCN/m
3 derived from
lowest NOAEL for mild headache in humans; NRC/COT 2002) as a reasonable
maximum, and estimation of an extrapolated alternative value (0.37 mg HCN/m
3)
for application in uncommon situations when a more lengthy dwell time (>8hb u t
<24 h) is possible (Table 2 and footnotes d and e).
Available data from which to estimate exposure guidelines for low-concentration
exposures to cyanogen chloride and phosgene are less robust than those available
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for the CW agents. As a consequence, certain reasonable assumptions were required
to develop exposure guidelines for these TICs, and are documented below.
As outlined earlier for the CW agents, the airport scenario considers that various
airport employees and personnel would be allowed access to, and occupancy of,
airport facilities only after decontamination for these volatile TICs is complete and
monitoring has characterized workspace atmospheres. Ongoing monitoring will en-
sure that exposures (if any) to compounds of concern would be extremely limited
given that detection of cyanogen chloride, phosgene or hydrogen cyanide would re-
sult in the prompt exclusion of such personnel until additional remediation occurs.
As a result of the protection afforded by monitoring and the time limits such mon-
itoring imposes on potential exposures, protective estimates developed for transit
passenger populations are also considered appropriate for airport employees and
personnel.
Cyanogen chloride. Cyanogen chloride (CK) is the least characterized of all com-
pounds considered under the airport scenario.
Existing exposure estimates for CK. Literature analysis identiﬁed no ERPG-1,
AEGL-1, or reference concentration (RfC; USEPA Integrated Risk Information Sys-
tem,IRIS)forCK.TheAIHA(1998)doesnotrecommendanERPG-1concentration
for CK because “serious health effects—including marked irritation—may occur be-
lowtheodorthresholds”of0.8to1.0ppmCK(2.01to2.51mgCK/m
3),andCKodor
thresholds are greater than the ERPG-2 concentration of 0.4 ppm (1.0 mg/m
3). The
National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous
Substances (NAC) has considered CK and commissioned development of a draft
technical support document for estimating AEGL values for this compound (Wood
1997). At present, the NAC has declined to propose or ﬁnalize AEGL values for
CK because of data limitations and minimal documentation characterizing dose
response and experimental protocols.
As a result, the present assessment considers the logic and protocols for RfC and
AEGL derivation as a way of evaluating information critical to development of pro-
tective airborne estimates for the transient traveling public, a principal population
of concern.
Data and options for CK. In the absence of suitable CK-speciﬁc toxicity data,
Opresko et al. (1998) estimated two oral reference doses (RfDe) for CK on the basis
of cyanide toxicity. One estimate (0.035 mg/kg-d) is based on reproductive toxicity
in cyanide (CN
−)-exposed rats (NTP 1993), in which both a lowest adverse effect
level (LOAEL) and a no observable adverse effect level (NOAEL) were identiﬁed.
The second RfD estimate (RfDe = 0.026 mg CK/kg-d) from Opresko et al. (1998)
was developed from human data reported by the Ministry of Health in Mozambique
(1984a,b) and based on effects associated with ingestion of CN
− found naturally
in cassava. Opresko et al. (1998) selected the estimated value of 0.03 mg CK/kg-
d as the best RfD estimate. An RfCe of 0.035 mg CK/m
3 can be derived from
this RfDe by adjusting for adult body weight (70 kg), adult inhalation rate (20
m
3/d), and applying an uncertainty factor of 3 to account for extrapolation between
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ingestion and inhalation exposure routes. If no adjustment is made for route-to-
route extrapolation, the RfCe would be 0.11 mg CK/m
3.
The USEPA/IRIS (2005) calculated an RfD for cyanogen chloride of 0.05 mg
CK/kg-dbasedondatafroma1955chronicdietarystudyinwhichratswerefedfood
fumigated with HCN (Howard and Hanzel 1955). A NOAEL was identiﬁed for CN
−
and converted to an equivalent dose of cyanogen chloride. The RfD was calculated
by applying uncertainty factors of 10 each for extrapolation between species and for
sensitivesubpopulations,andamodifyingfactorof5toaccountfortolerancetoCN
−
that may develop when exposure is via the diet rather than by gavage or ingestion in
drinking water. This value can be directly extrapolated to an RfC estimate (0.18 mg
CK/m
3) by assuming that the uncertainty factor for extrapolation between exposure
routes is 1, and adjusting for adult body weight (70 kg) and inhalation volume
(20 m
3/d). Alternatively, applying an uncertainty factor of 3 to adjust for
route-to-route extrapolation gives an RfC estimate of 0.058 mg CK/m
3.
Prior to 2008, Region 9 of the USEPA developed an air preliminary remediation
goal (PRG) for cyanogen chloride as an exposure guideline for chronic lifetime
inhalation exposure. [PRGs are risk-based concentrations intended to be used as
guidelines by risk assessors in initial screening-level evaluations of environmental
measurements (www.epa.gov/cgi-bin/)]. Region 9 extrapolated directly from the
USEPA IRIS oral RfD of 0.05 mg CK/kg-d to an inhalation RfD of 0.05 mg CK/kg-d.
By applying several default exposure assumptions (USEPA 2004a,b), USEPA Region
9 calculated an ambient air PRG of 0.18 mg CK/m
3. This value was withdrawn in
2008 when Region 9 recommended the use of Regional Screening Levels (RSLs) to
replace region-speciﬁc PRGs. No new chronic ambient air concentration for CK is
proposed because current derivation protocols do not support extrapolation from
oral RfDs. Estimated RfC values for cyanogen chloride are shown in Table 3.
Wood (1997) examined human case reports of CK exposures, epidemiological
studies conducted at CK-manufacturing facilities and experimental animal data
for the NAC. The concentration of 1 ppm (2.51 mg/m
3) is generally accepted as
the lowest irritant concentration for a 10–min exposure (Hartung 1994), but this
concentration has also been reported to result in copious tearing of the eyes in
some persons (Prentiss 1937; Jacobs 1942). Human exposure concentrations of 2
and 20 ppm (5.02 and 50.2 mg/m
3) are reported to be intolerable after 10- and
1-min exposures, respectively (Hartung 1994; Flury and Zernick 1931). Increased
Table 3. Summary of estimated RfC values for CK.
Derived from information Estimated RfC Uncertainty factor for
in these sources (mg/m3) route-to-route extrapolation
Opresko et al. 1998 0.11 1
0.035 3
USEPA IRIS 0.18 1
0.058 3
USEPA Region 9a 0.18a 1a
aWithdrawn in 2008.
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exposure duration to lower concentrations in humans (no duration or concentra-
tion speciﬁed) can result in inﬂammation of the conjunctiva and hoarseness (Flury
and Zernick 1931). A minimum detectable odor of 0.6 ppm (1.5 mg/m
3) has been
reported (Jacobs 1942). For both lethal and nonlethal effects of cyanogen chloride,
humans appear to be the most sensitive species. Although irritation and pulmonary
edema have been observed in animal studies, these signs occur at concentrations
greater than the approximate human irritation threshold of 1 ppm (2.51 mg/m
3).
Nonlethal studies of CK-exposed experimental animals are limited. Dogs recovered
from exposure to either 20 ppm (50 mg/m
3) for 20 min or 120 ppm (302 mg/m
3)
for 8 min, but not without severe injury (Hartung 1994; Flury and Zernick 1931).
These concentrations are more than one order of magnitude greater than the con-
centrations known to elicit signs and symptoms in humans.
Wood (1997) developed a draft technical support document that estimated an
AEGL-1 for CK on the basis of the reported minimum irritating concentration in
humansfromHartung(1994)[i.e.,1ppm(2.51mg/m
3)].AlthoughaNOAELisnot
identiﬁed in the available human data, this minimum irritation concentration of 1
ppm is not reported to be intolerable or debilitating. Application of an uncertainty
factor of 3 (for intraspecies variability) was considered appropriate because the
mechanism of action (and resulting physiological response) for an irritant vapor
is not expected to vary greatly among individuals in the population. The NAC
considered in 1997 that irritation described for CK is not likely to depend on
exposure duration for durations between 10 min and 8 h. As a consequence, the
NAC decided that it was not necessary to time-extrapolate between the estimated
10-min AEGL-1 [0.33 ppm (0.83 mg/m
3)] and the estimated 8-h AEGL-1 [also 0.33
ppm (0.83 mg/m
3)] (Wood 1997).
Given the incompleteness of toxicity data for CK, the present analysis concludes
that it is appropriate to apply an additional uncertainty factor of 3 to the minimum
irritant concentration of 1 ppm in humans (Hartung 1994). Application of the
resulting composite uncertainty factor of 10 (3 for intraspecies variability and 3
for database incompleteness) yields a concentration of 0.1 ppm (0.25 mg/m
3)a sa
protective estimate that is applicable to exposure durations less than 8 h. This value
is 3-fold lower than the draft AEGL-1, and is also less than the TLV
C   of 0.75 mg/m
3
(ACGIH 2003, 2008). Under maximal continuous exposure durations assumed in
the current analysis (greater than 8 h but less than 24 h), a protective assumption of
possible cumulative irritant effects is made. Thus, straight-line extrapolation from 8
h to 24 h provides a protective estimate of 0.03 ppm (0.08 mg/m
3).
Developing protective CK estimates for airport scenario. In the absence of con-
temporary experimental data, an ERPG-1 or a ﬁnalized AEGL-1, this analysis recom-
mends the following health-protective estimates as pre-planning clearance goals for
remediation (Table 2) under the LAX airport scenario parameters governing this
remediation assessment:
• Exposure durations of <8 h: 0.1 ppm CK (0.25 mg CK/m
3).
• Exposure durations of >8hb u t<24 h: 0.03 ppm CK (0.08 mg CK/m
3).
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Phosgene. Low-level exposure data for phosgene are sparse. The focus of this
evaluation is to identify those data adequate to support estimating a protective
exposure concentration of phosgene, as an AEGL-1 has never been developed for
this compound (NRC/COT 2002).
Existing exposure estimates for phosgene. Examination of the AEGL database,
as well as contact with staff and technical contractors managing the database, found
general concurrence that toxicity data on phosgene are inadequate to meet stan-
dard protocols (NRC/COT 2001) for deriving an AEGL-1 for any exposure du-
ration. For similar reasons, no ERPG-1 has been developed for phosgene by the
AIHA. Available reports and data considered for remediation guidance develop-
ment include Cucinell (1974), Currie et al. (1987a,b), Diller et al. (1985), Kaerkes
(1992), Kodavanti et al. (1997), NRC/COT (2002), USEPA (1986), and Selgrade
et al. (1995).
Data and options for phosgene. From an examination of data from Cucinell
(1974),Currieetal.(1987a,b),Dilleretal.(1985),andtheirevaluationbyNRC/COT
(2002), the present analysis draws the following conclusions. At the low exposures
tested (0.125 to 1 ppm, or 0.5 to 4 mg/m
3),
• there is no indication that effects such as decrease in lung ATP (adenosine
triphosphate) concentrations as well as increased bronchiolar alveolar lavage
ﬂuid protein in the laboratory rat are clinically signiﬁcant.
• there is no indication that the experimentally observed low-level effects noted
above are likely to progress to a clinically signiﬁcant level.
In other experiments, Selgrade et al. (1995) and Kodavanti et al. (1997) used iden-
tical exposure protocols in which rats were exposed to 0.1 to 1 ppm (0.4 to 4
mg/m
3) phosgene 6 h/d for 4 or 12 wk, followed by a 4-wk recovery period. In
Selgrade et al. (1995), the statistically signiﬁcant effects of 0.1 ppm (0.4 mg/m
3)
phosgene exposure included (1) Impaired pulmonary clearance of bacteria (an-
imals were challenged with a supra-physiological dose of airborne bacteria after
subchronic exposure to phosgene), (2) increased polymorphonuclear leukocytes
in bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) ﬂuid, and (3) decreased number of natural killer
cells in BAL ﬂuid.
In Kodavanti et al. (1997), the statistically signiﬁcant effects of 0.1 ppm (0.4
mg/m
3)phosgeneexposureincludedincreasedlung-to-body-weightratio,increased
lung displacement volume, thickening of terminal bronchioles accompanied by an
increased number of inﬂammatory cells, and increased level of pulmonary hydrox-
yproline. Collagen staining of the lungs also increased with phosgene exposure, but
was not evaluated for statistical signiﬁcance.
The USEPA (USEPA/IRIS, 2006) utilized data from Kodavanti et al. (1997) as the
principal study for deriving a reference concentration for phosgene. That analysis
concluded that collagen staining and elevated pulmonary hydroxyproline levels
documented by Kodavanti et al. (1997) represented pathological changes indicative
of ﬁbrosis. Although acknowledging that the reversibility of these effects is not
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actually known, the USEPA assumed that the changes did, in fact, reﬂect irreversible
lung ﬁbrosis, identiﬁed a NOAEL of 0.1 ppm (0. 4 mg/m
3), and derived an RfC of
3 × 10
−4 mg/m
3.
With the exception of the Kodavanti et al. (1997) data used for RfC derivation,
the documented effects of low-level phosgene exposure appear to be reversible and
represent indicators (biomarkers) of exposure only. They are not indicative of a
functionally or clinically signiﬁcant effect.
One issue raised in the reviewed papers is whether concentration (C) alone, or C
and time (Ct), are key determinants of observed effects for phosgene. Examination
of this issue by the NCR/COT (Subcommittee on AEGLs) determined that both C
and t are important in characterizing the toxicity of phosgene, and that the data do
not allow discrimination between C and t as a key determinant. As a consequence,
n = 1f o rt h eC
n × t = k relation, within limits for exposure duration (Haber 1924;
Ten Berge et al. 1986; NRC/COT 2001). The current analysis has found no data that
would support a value of n  = 1. NRC/COT (2002) consider the use of n = 1t ob e
valid for time extrapolation to 8 h. It is noteworthy that Haber’s Law (C × t = k;f o r
n = 1) was derived from phosgene data (Haber 1924).
Developing protective phosgene estimates for airport scenario. Comparison
with human and animal data in the AEGL category plots for phosgene illustrates the
protective nature of phosgene AEGL derivations (NRC/COT 2002). Data points
associated with the (calculated) phosgene AEGL-2 value line at 4-h exposure are
those of Currie et al. (1987a,b), and are considered biomarkers of exposure (de-
crease in lung ATP concentration in the rat; increased bronchiolar alveolar lavage
ﬂuid protein in the rat) with no known clinical signiﬁcance. Thus, the published
AEGL-2 values are already considered operationally protective. For comparison, if
the 8-h AEGL-2 concentration [0.04 ppm (0.16 mg/m
3)] is further down-adjusted
by a factor of 2 (i.e., 50%), the resulting concentrations [0.02 ppm (0.08 mg/m
3)
for 8 h; 0.007 ppm (0.03 mg/m
3) for 24 h] fall below the concentrations at which
Kodavanti et al. (1997) and Selgrade et al. (1995) observed no clinically signiﬁcant
effects in rats, even when exposure durations extended over weeks [i.e., 0.1-ppm
(0.4-mg/m
3) phosgene, 6 h/d for 4 or 12 wk].
In the absence of exposure guidelines for phosgene comparable to the AEGL-1,
the present evaluation considered existing analyses published and judged scientif-
ically credible by the NRC/COT; evaluated pertinent literature for extended ex-
posure durations; and obtained professional counsel from recognized pulmonary
toxicologists and investigators in the ﬁeld. The following concentrations of phos-
gene in air as derived from the toxicological investigation of NRC/COT (2002) can
be considered health-protective estimates for use as remediation guidelines (Table
2) under the scenario parameters governing this assessment:
• Exposure durations of <8 h: 0.02 ppm CG (0.08 mg CG/m
3).
• Exposure durations of >8hb u t<24 h: 0.007 ppm CG (0.03 mg CG/m
3).
Comparisonwithhumanoccupational(Kaerkes1992)andlaboratoryanimal(Diller
1985; Currie et al 1987a,b; Kodavanti et al. 1997; Selgrade et al. 1995) exposure data
documents the protective nature of the above recommended exposure guidelines.
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Either no effects or minimal reversible effects were observed at greater concentra-
tions (e.g., 0.1 and 0.35 ppm phosgene). In the case of Kaerkes (1992), workforce
monitoring of approximately 200 phosgene processing workers over a period of
10 yr (at an average of 34 phosgene exposures/yr) determined that no signs or
symptoms of phosgene toxicity were observed at repeated phosgene exposures at
concentrations at least 5 times greater than the reasonable maximum value of 0.02
ppm CG (0.08 mg CG/m
3) estimated above.
AGENT INGESTION GUIDELINES
As indicated in the plots of liquid CWA persistence on airport interior media
presented in the companion paper by Watson et al. (2011, this issue), it is highly
unlikely that non-persistent CWAs will remain on surfaces after decontamination
has been performed and veriﬁed. However, in cases where natural attenuation or
degradation can be anticipated, consideration of surface values becomes extremely
important. Post-release concerns could arise regarding the potential for persistent
agents such as sulfur mustard or VX to present a continued source of exposure if
liquidoraerosolsdropletshavebeenreleased.Tomeetpotentialwaste-management
determinations and landﬁll agreements with state and Federal agencies as well as
stakeholder concerns regarding disposition of porous media as well as soils associ-
atedwithhorticulturalplantingslocatedwithinTheBradleyInternationalTerminal,
referencedose(RfD)inputtostandardUSEPAexposuremodels[suchastheUSEPA
Regional Screening Levels for Chemical Contaminants at Superfund Sites (RSLs)
and Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRGs)] was evaluated. These same models are
often used to estimate protective concentration goals in water and food. Available
concentration goals developed for chemicals of concern are provided here to assist
pre-planning.
Tofacilitatesuchdeterminationswhennecessary,summarizedinTable4areavail-
able RfDs and reference dose estimates (RfDe) (in units of mg/kg/day) that have
been previously developed and published (Opresko et al. 1998, 2001; USEPA/IRIS
1993, 2005) for the airport compounds of concern. Principal CWA degradation
products of interest were previously identiﬁed in Watson et al. (2011, this issue);
available RfDs and RfDe for the principal CWA degradation products are summa-
rized in Table 5.
The CWA RfD estimates summarized in Table 4 have been previously incor-
porated into standard USEPA models developed by Region 9 (PRG) and Region
3 [Risk-Based Concentration (RBC) model] (USEPA 1996a,b, 2001) to develop
agent-speciﬁc and health-based environmental screening levels (USACHPPM 1999;
Watson and Dolislager, 2007). Resulting RBC and PRG values for airport scenario
compounds are summarized in Table 6. For the purpose of the present analy-
sis, Regional Screening Levels (RSLs) have also been estimated by application of
the RSL calculator available at USEPA (2009a; http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/
risk/human/rb-concentration table/usersguide.htm). Because PRG, RBC and RSL
models incorporate assumptions of continuous release and multi-year exposure du-
rations, the health-based screening levels in Table 6 are highly protective under
the one-time, single-release airport scenario, which incorporates subsequent source
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Table 4. Reference dose (RfD) and reference dose estimates (RfDe)f o rC W A s
and TICs.
a
Chronic Reference dose (RfD or RfDe)
(mg/kg/day) Ingestion: estimate of daily exposure
level for general population; chronic exposure
CWA or TIC duration (7 yr to lifetime)
Tabunb (GA) 4 × 10−5
Sarinb (GB) 2 × 10−5
Somanb (GD) and Cyclosarinb (GF) 4 × 10−6
VXb 6 × 10−7
Sulfur mustardb (H/HD) 7 × 10−6
Hydrogen cyanidec (AC) 0.02
Cyanogen chlorided (CK) 0.05
Phosgenee (CG) No estimate availablee
aAdapted from Munro et al. (1999) and Talmage et al. (2007a).
bOpresko et al. (2001). Values for nerve and sulfur mustard agents are estimates (RfDe)a n d
considered scientiﬁcally valid by the National Research Council (NRC/COT 1999; Bakshi
et al. 2000); they have not been formally reviewed by IRIS. The value for GF is also an RfDe
and has been developed by analogy to GD.
cUSEPA/IRIS (1993).
dUSEPA/IRIS (2005). A comprehensive review of toxicological studies was completed in
May, 2005; USEPA determined that results of review did not warrant a change in RfD at that
time (http://www.epa.gov/ncea/iris/subst). CK also known as chlorine cyanide.
eIRIS (http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst) states that phosgene oral RfD was under discussion as
of January 31, 2006. There has been no change in this determination as of August 2010.
removal and decontamination. PRG and RSL estimates incorporate consideration
of chronic incidental soil ingestion as well as dermal contact with soil, and inhala-
tion of particulates and vapors emitted from soil (USEPA 1991, 1996a,b, 2001).
Calculation of risk-based concentrations (RBCs) from the RBC model does not con-
sider inhalation or dermal contact components, which are important to overall risk
management analysis and ﬁnal determination of acceptable clearance goals. As a
consequence, RBC values are provided only for completeness.
The Regional Screening Level (RSL) application was released by the USEPA
in late 2008; the RSL user guide disclaimer states that the RSL guidance is not
mandatory, does not provide binding rules, and points out that alternative ap-
proaches for risk assessment may be more appropriate on a site-speciﬁc ba-
sis(USEPA2009a,http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/risk/human/rb-concentration
table/usersguide.htm). While originally developed by Regions 3, 6, and 9, the RSLs
arepresently(August2010)acceptedbymanyotherUSEPAregions.Itisknownthat
PreliminaryRemediationGoals(PRGs)otherthanRSLsareincurrentusewithinall
ten USEPA Regions, and reference to PRG use continues to be valid at this writing.
In 2004, USEPA Region 9 had developed PRG values for HCN and cyanogen
chloride ingestion based on long-term (chronic) and direct ingestion of contami-
natedsoil(USEPA2005).ThesamePRGvaluesarelistedinthemostrecentregional
screeninglevelupdate(USEPA2008)identiﬁedasanupdateoftheUSEPARegion3
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Table 7. Health-based environmental screening levels for principal CWA
degradation products in residential and industrial soils and employing
EPA PRG parameters.
Residential soil Industrial soil
Outdoor Worker Indoor Worker
Preliminary Preliminary Preliminary
Remediation Remediation Remediation
Goal (PRG) Goal (PRG) Goal (PRG)
(mg/kg soil)a,b (mg/kg soil)a (mg/kg soil)a
Degradation Product of CW Agent (estimates) (estimates) (estimates)
TDG (thiodyglycol) 2.4 × 104 6.0 × 104 8.2 × 105
EMPA (ethyl methylphosphonic acid) 1.7 × 103 4.2 × 103 5.7 × 104
MPA (methyl phosphonic acid) 1.2 × 103 3.0 × 103 4.1 × 104
EA 2192 4.7 × 10−2 6.8 × 10−1 1.2
aDerived and presented in Watson and Dolislager (2007). PRG values to be used as a
screening goal or initial cleanup level, and are considered protective for humans (including
sensitive groups) over a lifetime. Guideline only, not regulation.
bMay be used alone or in conjuction with vapor exposure criteria to assess possible existence
of residual agent in semi-porous or porous media and to demonstrate potential for chemical
agent being present in/on item or material at levels of public health concern. Useful for
facilities and areas potentially exposed to extended high-concentration vapor or liquid
concentrations (DA 2008, Table C-5).
RBC Table, Region 6 HHMSSL (Human Health Medium-Speciﬁc Screening Levels)
Table and the Region 9 PRG Table.
As of this writing, Region 9 maintains a link to the 2004 PRGs as well as providing
RSLs. Analogous values have not been developed for phosgene. Separate PRGs that
address either residential- or industrial-use scenarios (Table 6) are available from
USEPA (2005, 2008) for hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride.
RfD information for degradation products of interest has also been incorporated
into PRG models to develop compound-speciﬁc degradation product concentration
estimatesforsoil(Table7).Thisapproachcouldbeemployedtodevelopsite-speciﬁc
degradation product estimates for water and food in accordance with site-speciﬁc
risk management criteria.
Drinking water concentrations considered protective estimates for the chemicals
of concern and summarized as compound-speciﬁc concentrations in Table 8 are
developed from assumptions of a 5 or 15 liter/day drinking water consumption
rate (DA 2005b, 2010). Because most U.S. domestic drinking water consumption
rate estimates for adults are ≤2 liter/day (USEPA 1989), the low drinking water
concentrations resulting from an assumed 5 or 15-liter/day consumption rate are
thus highly protective (e.g., lower concentration associated with high-volume con-
sumption) for application as general public decision criteria for water ingestion.
ItisnotedthatsubchronicRfDsforsomepersistent(illicitdrug)compoundssuch
as methamphetamine are being used by the California Environmental Protection
Agency (CalEPA) Ofﬁce of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA)
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Table 8. Drinking water concentrations considered protective estimates for site
decontamination and veriﬁcation.
5 liter/day 15 liter/day
consumptiona consumptiona
CWA or TIC Drinking water concentration (µg/L)
Tabun (GA) <140 <46
Sarin (GB) <28 <9.3
Soman (GD) <12 <4
VX <15 <5
Generic nerve agent <12 < 4b
Sulfur mustard (HD) <140 <47
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN; agent AC) <6 <2
aDOD Tri-Service standard for adult consumption rate of 5 and 15 liter/day, respectively, for
exposure duration <7 days (DA 2005b). The most recent update to these Tri-Service
standards (DA 2010) makes no reference to the daily volume of water ingested and
establishes the same concentrations presented above for 15 liter/day consumption as
standard (e.g., no concentrations speciﬁc to 5 liters/day consumption). DA (2010) further
recommends application of the “Generic nerve agent” concentration of 4 µg/L for all nerve
agents.
b“Generic nerve agent” water concentration standard equivalent to lowest concentration
estimated for all nerve agents evaluated.
(Salocks 2007, 2008, 2009) in determination of protective re-entry criteria to build-
ings formerly used as clandestine manufacturing facilities and that have undergone
decontamination.Thishost-stateexampledocumentsthatsubchronicRfDestimates
are recognized as useful and appropriate for speciﬁc screening level assessment
applications and thus appropriate for the LAX scenario CWAs and TICs; USEPA
(2009b) recognizes the utility of this approach by California regulatory authorities
in developing a health-based target remediation standard for methamphetamine.
Oral Minimal Risk Levels (MRLs) are presently available only for sulfur mustard
agent HD (MRL for acute-duration exposure of ≤14 d is 0.0005 mg HD/kg/d; MRL
for intermediate-duration exposure of 15 to 364 d is 0.00007 mg/kg/d) (ATSDR
2003), and may also be useful for speciﬁc screening assessments.
GUIDELINES FOR IN-SITU ITEMS
Following a terrorist attack involving the release of a CWA or TIC, it may be nec-
essary to decontaminate, handle, or otherwise manage large in-place items, such as
X-ray scanners. It will also be necessary to manage numerous objects such as furni-
ture and potentially contaminated samples. General guidance for sample handling
is summarized on a compound-speciﬁc basis in recently published Quick Reference
Guides forCWAs(NRT2009;availableatwww.nrt.org).TheNationalResponseTeam
cautions that sample packaging or shipping protocols should be closely coordinated
with the receiving analytical laboratory.
The previously derived “Reasonable maximum re-entry screening guidelines”
(Table 2; equivalent to the 8-hAEGL 1), may be used as appropriately protective and
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health-based vapor screening criteria for releasing items, equipment and facilities
that have not been contaminated by liquid or aerosol forms of the chemicals of
concern (DA 2008, Table C-5). Further, these same screening criteria would also be
useful to evaluate decontaminated non-porous items and surfaces, providing that
vapor and surface screening criteria are attained (DA 2008).
For solid matrices, existing Health Based Environmental Screening Levels
(mg/kg; HBESLs) as documented in Table 6 for nerve and sulfur mustard agents
are considered highly protective exposure criteria for lifetime (24-h) daily ingestion
exposure by the general population (based on NOAEL; USACHPPM 1999; Watson
and Dolislager 2007). These criteria could be used alone or in parallel with vapor
exposure criteria (see above) to assess potential existence of residual nerve or sulfur
mustard agents within porous or semi-porous media at a level of public health in-
signiﬁcance. Such solid matrix decision criteria could be reasonably applied in the
event of an extended high-concentration vapor or liquid exposure.
During World War I (WWI), the U.S. Government established an experimental
facility (American University Experiment Station) in Spring Valley (in what was
then rural Maryland) for testing and preparing chemical warfare compounds, in-
cendiaries, smokes, and signal materials for use in battleﬁelds (Zongkar 2010).
Protective clothing and equipment to counter use of such materials were also de-
veloped at the Spring Valley facility. The facility was closed at the end of the War,
and agent-containing materials underwent disposal in various pits and trenches on-
site. CWAs and TICs tested at the facility included vesicant agents sulfur mustard
and Lewisite (an organic arsenical not included in the airport threat scenario),
phosgene, cyanogen chloride, arsine, and chloropicrin. Nerve agents were not for-
mulated until decades after WWI and are not an issue at Spring Valley (PARSONS
2007).
As a result of urban growth since the close of WWI, the former American Uni-
versity Experiment Station is now located within the District of Columbia. Protocols
have recently been developed to guide sample and site clearance of soils, scrap, PPE,
and bulk items recovered from the Spring Valley site in metropolitan Washington,
D.C. (PARSONS 2007).
Criteria for the Spring Valley site and materials release involve warming a sam-
ple (15 min equilibration at 90 ± 10
◦F for soil; 4 h equilibration at 70 ± 10
◦F
for scrap, PPE and bulk items); analyzing headspace offgas concentrations of HD,
phosgene, and CK; then comparing offgas concentrations with agent-speciﬁc expo-
sure limits (see below for speciﬁc values; Appendix J of PARSONS 2007). Sample
clearance determinations at Spring Valley are as follows (Appendix J of PARSONS
2007):
• If offgas concentrations are <0.25 of the short term exposure limit (STEL)
(i.e., equal to 0.00075 mg/m
3 for sulfur mustard, 0.10 mg/m
3 for phosgene,
and 0.15 mg/m
3 for CK), the sample is cleared for disposal.
• Ifoffgasconcentrationsare>0.25oftheSTEL(i.e.,equalto0.00075mg/m
3for
sulfur mustard, 0.10 mg/m
3 for phosgene, 0.15 mg/m
3 f o rC K ) ,t h e ns a m p l e s
are reheated and allowed to equilibrate at the media-speciﬁc temperatures
identiﬁed above, and re-sampled.
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Application of the above guidelines would be useful in making clearance determi-
nations involving problematic in-place items otherwise difﬁcult (or destructive) to
treat with aqueous solutions, foams, oxidizing vapors, and so on.
GUIDELINES FOR SURFACE CONTACT WITH POTENTIAL CWA
AND DEGRADATION PRODUCT RESIDUES
Given the chemical and physical characteristics of the scenario compounds of
concern [Watson et al. (2011, this issue), Table 2] and the efﬁcacy of compound-
speciﬁc decontamination materials and methods (Ho et al. 2006), it is unlikely that
scenario CWA or TIC residues would exist on surfaces in quantities sufﬁcient to
pose a toxicological hazard after source removal and decontamination have been
performed. Nevertheless, a contact hazard analysis that focuses on the persistent
nerve agent VX and the persistent vesicant agent sulfur mustard (HD) has been
performed to address stakeholder community requests for protective guidance re-
garding potential surface residues. The working assumption is that, in the unlikely
event that exposed skin comes in contact with any residual compound of concern,
the residue could be transferred to hands and subsequently carried to the eyes
and mouth multiple times/day. Resuspension inhalation of particulates has also
been considered. Exposure estimates, termed Surface Removal Contaminant Levels
(SRCLs), have been developed and calculated so as to prevent development of a
minimal and reversible effect threshold; SRCLs represent an estimated surface con-
centration in mass per unit area (mg/cm
2). Speciﬁc parameters and assumptions
are identiﬁed and characterized below.
For VX, the SRCL estimates are designed to prevent non-adverse levels of miosis
(the ﬁrst noticeable effect) in the absence of any other signs or measureable inhi-
bition of blood cholinesterase activity. For HD, the SRCL estimates are designed to
prevent mild reversible ocular irritation (the most sensitive endpoint and tissue).
Concepts and protocols considered by the USEPA dermal risk-assessment guid-
ance (USEPA 2004a) have been evaluated for application to the airport chemical
terrorist release scenario. In addition, information from the World Trade Center
(WTC) Indoor Assessment (COPC 2003) as well as the U.S. Army Man-in-Simulant
Test (MIST) Program (NRC/BAST 1997) to calculate risk-based and site-speciﬁc
concentrations for building interiors is also incorporated. Other sources contribut-
ing to the evaluation of acceptable residues on surfaces include agent-speciﬁc per-
cutaneous toxicity data, concepts of acceptable residues and re-entry intervals de-
veloped by various state agencies and the USEPA for pesticide-treated crops, and
exposure models under development by USEPA’s National Exposure Research Lab-
oratory (Stallings et al. 2008; Zartarian et al. 2008; Cohen Hubal et al. 2000, among
others). Concepts underlying risk-based criteria developed by CalEPA for use in
assessing child potential exposure to surface methamphetamine residues in former
clandestine laboratories (Salocks 2007, 2008, 2009) also contribute to the analyses.
The equations used in this assessment are also based on the USEPA Risk Assessment
Guidance for Superfund (USEPA 1991). The stochastic model approach developed by
CalEPA was used for veriﬁcation purposes in the present assessment. As data allow,
and as recommended by CalEPA, compound-speciﬁc subchronic reference doses
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have been estimated for the scenario compounds and incorporated into the present
calculation of SRCLs.
The same analytical procedure has been applied to previously identiﬁed, stable,
agent-speciﬁc degradation products of toxicological concern, such as methyl phos-
phonic acid (MPA) and EA 2192 (potential hydrolysis product of agent VX, which
occurs when pH is not adequately controlled during VX decontamination) (Michel
et al. 1962; also Watson et al. 2011, this issue, Table 3).
Estimated SRCLs for persistent CWAs and key degradation products are unique
to the present analysis and are developed here as reasonable maximum exposure
(RME) concentrations derived from standardized equations that combine exposure
information and available compound-speciﬁc toxicity information. SRCLs are pre-
sented for child transit passengers (the most susceptible transit passenger subpop-
ulation with expected maximal exposure to surface residues due to frequent object
mouthing behavior and potential for large-area skin contact with airport terminal
surfaces) as well as various airport employees and personnel. SRCLs presented here
are protective risk-based screening values for use in evaluating surfaces that have
(or may have) been in contact with HD or VX released during a chemical terrorist
event, or degradation products of interest. SRCL analysis has been performed as a
screening level assessment to protect against the unlikely event that airport surfaces
have been incompletely decontaminated and inadequately sampled and monitored.
It is suggested that SRCL results be used during post-decontamination monitoring
to ascertain that surface contact hazards to chemical residues do not remain. Ex-
ceeding a SRCL usually suggests that further evaluation of the potential chemical
risks is warranted, while attainment of SRCL levels would indicate that potential
chemical risk is so low as to allow unprotected access to the terminal by the general
public as well as various airport employees and personnel. In addition to utility as
screening levels, SRCLs could also be used to trigger further investigation or serve
as initial clearance goals for decision-makers.
Assumptions Regarding Percutaneous Contact with Residual Liquids or Aerosols
The more volatile compounds on the scenario threat list (e.g., the nonpersistent
G-series nerve agents and the TICs phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen
chloride) dissipate readily and pose much less risk of percutaneous contact or non-
dietary ingestion exposure to deposited liquid or aerosol than the persistent CWA
compounds HD and VX. Nevertheless, equations developed to evaluate persistent
compounds can also be applied to provide highly protective estimates for the more
volatile compounds.
It is understood that agents HD and VX will volatilize and degrade by known
processes such as hydrolysis during the interval between the time of release and
initiation of decontamination as well as during the interval between completion
of decontamination and ﬁnalization of a clearance decision [Watson et al. (2011,
this issue), Tables 2 through 4; and Talmage et al. 2007a,b)]. To ensure protective-
ness, known rates of volatilization and degradation are not factored into the SRCL
equations.
The instability of liquid HCN [NIOSH 2005b; Aaron 1996; ATSDR 2005, 2006;
Watson et al. (2011, this issue), Table 2] indicates that HCN deposited as a liquid,
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or present as a residual aerosol, will not persist for more than a few minutes at
ambient temperature. The possibility of direct percutaneous exposure to liquid or
aerosolized HCN is also considered extremely low.
Assumed opportunities for exposure to a toddler child transit passenger would
be from contacting hard surfaces (vinyl ﬂoors and chairs, desks, counters, walls,
etc.) and soft surfaces (carpet, upholstered chairs, drapes, etc) with hands and other
exposedskin.Afractionofanycompoundtransferredtohandsisassumedtobesub-
sequently transferred to eyes and mouth. To develop a protective estimate, exposure
assumptions for a toddler child transit passenger (the most susceptible population)
have been selected as representative of the entire transit passenger population. Fur-
ther, any potential adult airport employee/personnel exposure is assumed to occur
during contact with hard or soft surfaces such as carpets, counters, drapes, seating,
walls, and ceilings during post-decontamination activities.
Because the eye is extremely sensitive to the effects of HD and VX vapor and
liquid (NRC/COT 2003), contact hazard equations focus on consideration of eye
exposure to estimate the most protective SRCL. This is a unique aspect of the
current assessment, as direct eye exposure is not commonly evaluated in surface
contact assessments. Agent-speciﬁc eye contact (ocular) toxicity values were not
available in the literature; as a consequence, dermal toxicity values for skin were
substituted, and 100% transfer from hand to eye was assumed; this approach is
considered protective.
Media that can be sampled for comparison to the SRCLs could range from agent-
laden dust to any surface ﬁlms transferable to a sample wipe or surface probe.
Surface Exposure Parameters
Exposure parameters, variables, and values incorporated into the SRCL model
equations for agents HD and VX, as well as HD and VX degradation products, are
identiﬁed and characterized in Tables 9 and 10. To account for variability in likely
exposure scenarios, estimates are presented for the average and maximum antic-
ipated exposures. Such an analysis replicates many of the assumptions employed
in the WTC assessment for indoor environments (COPC 2003). A notable devia-
tion from the WTC assessment is the fact that the present SRCL equations do not
include a dissipation factor for surface residues. Instead, the present analysis in-
corporates agent degradation rates previously summarized in Watson et al. (2011,
this issue) to evaluate SRCL-speciﬁc exposure durations and frequencies. Calcula-
tions in Watson et al. (2011, this issue; Table 4 and Figure 6) illustrate that multiple
degradation half-lives for VX and HD can be achieved in less than 2 d following
application of appropriate decontamination solutions. In the case of the present
analysis, selection of values for ED and EF are based on well-characterized and rapid
degradation generated during the preceding decontamination phase. Hence, the
SRCL equations do not include a decay/dissipation rate. While traditional exposure
assessments have been based on consideration of human activity patterns and not
the presence/absence of contamination (USEPA 1991), rapid agent degradation
generated during the decontamination phase directs the selection of ED and EF
values in the present analysis.
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Table 9. Exposure parameter assumptions for HD and VX incorporated into
SRCL assessment.
a
Estimated airport Estimated airport
Parameter average maximum Units
ABSHD 0.084 0.084 Unitless
ABSVX 0.033 0.033 Unitless
BWw 70 70 Kg
BWc 15 15 Kg
CF1 3.65E+02 3.65E+02 days/year
CF2 0.041667 0.041667 days/hour
CF3 10000 10000 cm2/m2
DF work HD 285 427.5 cm2/day
DF work VX 8.075 12.1125 cm2/day
DF trans child HD 70.0 420 cm2/day
DF trans child VX 1.98 11.9 cm2/day
ED work 1 1 Years
ED child 1 1 Years
EF work 2 2 days/year
EF trans (child) 2 2 day/year
ETh child 2 12 hours/day
ETh work 4 6 hours/day
ETs work 4 6 hours/day
ETs child 2 12 hours/day
FQc 9.5 9.5 events/hour
FQeye 10 10 event/day
FQwork 1 1 event/hour
FTSHSh HD 0.5 0.5 Unitless
FTSHSh VX 0.0018 0.0018 Unitless
FTSHSs HD 0.1 0.1 Unitless
FTSHSs VX 0.0152 0.0152 Unitless
FTSBSh HD 0.25 0.25 Unitless
FTSBSh VX 0.0009 0.0009 Unitless
FTSBSs HD 0.05 0.05 Unitless
FTSBSs VX 0.0076 0.0076 Unitless
GIABS HD&VX 1 1 Unitless
IF work HD 54 81 cm2/day
IF work VX 1.53 2.295 cm2/day
IF trans HD 85.5 513 cm2/day
IF trans VX 2.4225 14.535 cm2/day
OF work HD 33.4 50.1 cm2/day
OF work VX 0.9463 1.4195 cm2/day
OF trans HD 16.7 100.2 cm2/day
OF trans VX 0.47 2.839 cm2/day
RF 1.00E−06 1.00E−06 m−1
RfD est. subchron HD 7.00 E−05 7.00 E−05 mg HD/kg/d
RfD est. subchron VX 2.00 E−06 2.00 E−06 mg VX/kg/d
SA eyes 33.4 33.4 cm2/event
SA trans exposed skin 2800 2800 cm2/day
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Table 9. Exposure parameter assumptions for HD and VX incorporated into
SRCL assessment.
a (Continued)
Estimated airport Estimated airport
Parameter average maximum Units
SA trans hand 15 15 cm2/event
SA work exposed skin 5700 5700 cm2/day
SA work hand 45 45 cm2/event
SE 0.5 0.5 Unitless
THQ 1 1 Unitless
AT nc 365∗ED 365∗ED Days
aVariables: dermal absorption factor (ABS), averaging time (AT), body weight (BW),
conversion factor (CF1–3), dermal factor (DF), exposure duration (ED), exposure frequency
(EF), exposure time (ET), frequency of hand-to-mouth for child (FQc), frequency of
hand-to-eye (FQeye), fraction transferred from surface to body skin (FTSBS), fraction
transferred from surface to hand skin (FTSHS), gastrointestinal absorption factor (GIABS),
ingestion factor (IF), ocular rubbing factor (OF), resuspension factor (RF), reference dose
(RfD), hand surface area (SAhand), exposed skin surface area (SAtrans and SAwork), eye
surface area (SAeye), saliva extraction factor (SE), target hazard quotient (THQ); “c” and
“w” modifers refer to child transit passenger and various airport employees and personnel
(worker), respectively; “s” and “h” modiﬁers refer to soft and hard surfaces, respectively;
“nc” refers to non-cancer. See text for deﬁnitions and assumptions.
Illustrated in Figure 1 are the SRCL equation and calculation for estimating
VX effects for toddler child (sensitive receptor) transit passengers; in Figure 2
are presented the comparable VX SRCL model equation and calculation for air-
port employees and personnel. While nerve agent VX was chosen as the example
calculation for Figures 1 and 2, the user can substitute HD- or degradation product-
speciﬁc parameters as needed. Presented in Figure 3 is a conceptual site model of
potential exposure pathways evaluated for surfaces (as modeled in Figures 1 and 2)
as well as direct and offgas vapor exposure.
Exposure time (ET)
Exposure time (ET) for this surface analysis represents the estimated hours per
day that a receptor spends in contact with potentially contaminated media. In gen-
eral, exposure times vary by exposure scenario, age of the receptor, and whether the
source is located on a hard or soft surface. Most ET data and USEPA default values
for children [COPC (2003) and the USEPA Ofﬁce of Pesticide Programs (OPP)]
have been experimentally determined from USEPA observational studies charac-
terizing the time spent by child residents per day in the kitchen and bathroom.
Estimates of carpet exposure time are based on remaining indoor time, excluding
sleeping. The World Trade Center assessment (COPC 2003) judged these data to be
representative of many children under age 6 who spend most of their time at home.
Itisacknowledgedthatpotentialexposuresatanairportwouldnotberepresentative
of at-home exposures in terms of activity and duration, and that data characterizing
time spent on hard and soft surfaces at airports are not available.
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Table 10. Exposure parameter assumptions for signiﬁcant HD and VX
breakdown products incorporated into SRCL assessment.
Estimated airport Estimated airport
Parameter average maximum Units
ABSTDG 0.009 0.009 Unitless
ABSEMPA 0.084 0.084 Unitless
ABSMPA 0.084 0.084 Unitless
ABSEA2192 0.0 0.0 Unitless
DF trans child TDG 70 420 cm2/day
DF trans child EMPA 70 420 cm2/day
DF trans child MPA 70 420 cm2/day
DF trans child EA2192 1.98 11.9 cm2/day
FTSHSh TDG 0.5 0.5 Unitless
FTSHSh EMPA 0.5 0.5 Unitless
FTSHSh MPA 0.5 0.5 Unitless
FTSHSh EA2192 0.0018 0.0018 Unitless
FTSHSs TDG 0.1 0.1 Unitless
FTSHSs EMPA 0.1 0.1 Unitless
FTSHSs MPA 0.1 0.1 Unitless
FTSHSs EA2192 0.0152 0.0152 Unitless
FTSBSh TDG 0.25 0.25 Unitless
FTSBSh EMPA 0.25 0.25 Unitless
FTSBSh MPA 0.25 0.25 Unitless
FTSBSh EA2192 0.0009 0.0009 Unitless
FTSBSs TDG 0.05 0.05 Unitless
FTSBSs EMPA 0.05 0.05 Unitless
FTSBSs MPA 0.05 0.05 Unitless
FTSBSs EA2192 0.0076 0.0076 Unitless
IF trans TDG 85.5 513 cm2/day
IF trans EMPA 85.5 513 cm2/day
IF trans MPA 85.5 513 cm2/day
IF trans EA2192 2.4225 14.5 cm2/day
OF trans TDG 16.7 100.2 cm2/day
OF trans EMPA 16.7 100.2 cm2/day
OF trans MPA 16.7 100.2 cm2/day
OF trans EA2192 0.47 2.839 cm2/day
RfD est. subchron TDG 4.00E+00 4.00E+00 mg TDG/kg/d
RfD est. subchron EMPA 2.80E−01 2.80E−01 mg EMPA/kg/d
RfD est. subchron MPA 2.00E−01 2.00E−01 mg MPA/kg/d
RfD est. subchron EA2192 2.00E−06 2.00E−06 mg EA2192/kg/d
RfC est. subchron TDG 4.70E+00 4.70E+00 mg TDG/m3
RfC est. subchron EMPA 3.40E−01 3.40E−01 mg EMPA/ m3
RfC est. subchron MPA 2.40E−01 2.40E−01 mg MPA/ m3
RfC est. subchron EA2192 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 mg EA2192/ m3
Variables: See footnote to Table 9.
Tomorecloselyrepresentthenon-residentcharacteristicsoftheairportchemical
terrorist scenario, it was necessary to depart from use of generic default exposure
parameters (e.g., child resident defaults are 8 h/day for carpets and 4 h/day for
hard surfaces) (COPC 2003). As a consequence, this analysis divided the exposure
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Figure 3. Conceptual site model of potential exposure pathways evaluated.
to hard and soft surfaces equally for a full 24 h (e.g.,1 2hf o rh a r da n d1 2hf o r
soft). The duration that a passenger spends in a terminal is designated as the “dwell
time” or stay time (CAM 2005). The Center for Airport Management (CAM 2005)
data revealed that the total dwell time for most passengers is ≤4 h. Because the
time spent in a terminal in one day can vary greatly, an average, minimum total ET
to hard and soft surfaces is estimated to be 4 h (e.g., 2 h for soft surface exposure
plus 2 h for hard surface exposure), and the maximum is estimated to be 24 h (to
accommodate long layovers and delays) (e.g., 12 h each for soft and hard surface
exposures).
COPC(2003)doesnotprovideinformationonWTCgenericemployeeexposures
to hard and soft surfaces. Because of the high variability of potential surface contact
for airport employees and personnel, surface exposure time is also divided equally
between exposure to hard and soft surfaces in the current analysis. Furthermore,
because the workday length can vary, an average total workday ET to hard and soft
surfaces was estimated to be 8 h (regular work shift), and the maximum is estimated
to be 12 h. The same work shift assumptions are used by the CDC (DHHS 2003,
2004) and USEPA (1997).
Exposure duration (ED)
The equations in Figures 1 and 2 were developed for this analysis and for non-
carcinogeniceffects.Theseequationsareconsistentwithexaminationofcompound-
speciﬁc toxicological data that indicate diminishing toxic response and effects re-
covery following cessation of exposure. In non-cancer effect PRG equations, the ex-
posure duration (ED) in the numerator multiplied by 365 days per year represents
the time over which exposure is averaged. The ED in the denominator multiplied
by the exposure frequency represents the time of exposure. Dividing the numerator
by the denominator “pro-rates” the exposure (USEPA 1989).
Exposure durations between 2 weeks and less than 7 years are consid-
ered subchronic, while exposure durations greater than 7 years are considered
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chronic (USEPA 1989). For the transit passenger receptor as well as airport em-
ployee/personnel receptors, an ED of one year is selected for the present analysis.
This ED is based on the degradation analysis performed in the ﬁrst paper of this
series (Watson et al. 2011, this issue; Table 4 and Figure 6), which illustrates that mul-
tiple degradation half-lives for persistent agents VX and HD can be achieved in less
than 2 days following application of appropriate decontamination solutions. Note
that an exposure duration of 1 year is the smallest exposure duration presented in
USEPA (1989) for standard risk equations.
It is recognized that most exposure parameters have been traditionally based on
human activity patterns and not the presence/absence of contamination (USEPA
1991). In the case of a transit passenger, it is possible that, during a single round
trip, a passenger would pass through the same terminal during a single year. Also,
it is acknowledged that, without appropriate consideration of the decontamination
phase and well-characterized degradation reactions previously discussed (Watson
etal.2011,thisissue;Talmageetal.2007a,b;Yangetal.1994;Yang1999;manyothers),
someinvestigatorsmayunknowinglyconsidersettingtheEDforanairportemployee
as high as the EPA-recommended default of 25 years. Previous characterization of
the agent release and response scenario (Watson et al. 2011, this issue) precludes
the necessity of relying on default values. With appropriate decontamination and
treatment, a persistent compound from the airport scenario threat list can pose a
nonpersistent hazard in that any residual contamination can be quickly degraded.
No chronic exposure duration [e.g., > 7 years as per (USEPA 1991)] is assumed.
Exposure frequency (EF)
Exposure frequency (EF) is the number of days within the ED that exposure is
assumed to occur. Based on human activity, it is reasoned that a single round-trip
transit passenger may be exposed to potentially contaminated surfaces in the same
terminal for a maximum of 2 days during a single round trip (the ﬁrst day for
trip departure, and the second day for the trip return). Additionally, and based on
the ED discussion above and calculations in Watson et al. (2011, this issue; Table 4
and Figure 6) illustrating that multiple degradation half-lives for VX and HD are
achieved in less than 2 days following application of appropriate decontamination
solutions, an EF of 2 days/year was selected for the transit passenger. No chronic
exposure is assumed
The EF assumptions for airport employees and personnel mirror those of the
transitpassengers(e.g.,norepeatexposurecycles).AnEFof2days/yearwasselected
forvariousairportemployeesandpersonnelbasedonthedegradationanalysisabove
and in Watson et al. (2011, this issue).
Fraction transferred from surface to hand skin (FTSHS)
The FTSHS is the fraction of residue on a surface that could be transferred to
the skin of the hand. Hand-press experiments with house-dust surrogate particles
were conducted to measure surface transfer to dry skin (Rodes et al. 2001). Based
on Rodes et al. (2001), the WTC report (COPC 2003) recommended use of default
transferfractionsof10%forcarpetsand50%forhardsurfaces(suchasvinyl).Inad-
dition,COPC(2003)referencesanUSEPAMalathion
R  exposurestudythatreported
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Malathion
R   transfer-to-hand results of 0.0018 (0.18%) and 0.0152 (1.52%) for vinyl
ﬂooringandcarpets,respectively.Malathion
R  (C10H19O6PS2)isanorganophosphate
insecticide that is physically similar to nerve agent VX (C11H26NO2PS) in many re-
spects (vapor pressures of VX and malathion are 7 × 10
−4 and 1.78 × 10
−4 mm Hg,
respectively, while Henry’s Law constants for VX and malathion are 3.5 × 10
−9 and
4.9× 10
−9atm-m
3/mole, respectively) (NRC/COT2003;Daubert and Danner 1989;
Fendinger and Glotfelty 1990).Itis thus reasonable toapply the Malathion
R  -speciﬁc
FTSHS fractions provided in COPC (2003) for use in estimating a value for VX. Due
to the unavailability of HD-speciﬁc transfer rates, the assumed FTSHS fractions for
HD are the generic defaults recommended by COPC (2003) of 10% for soft and
50% for hard surfaces.
Fraction transferred from surface to body skin (FTSBS)
In terms of the fraction transferred from surface to body skin (FTSBS) for der-
mal contact, it is important to consider that, in comparison to hands, much less
transfer will occur to body regions such as the arms, legs, and face that have typically
less intensive surface contact. In accordance with assumptions made in the WTC
report (COPC 2003), fractions for surface-to-hand transfer were reduced by half to
represent an area-weighted transfer to all exposed body skin.
Hand surface area (SAhand)
Hand surface area (SA hand) is the skin area contacted during a mouthing event.
The WTC report (COPC 2003) assumes that the ﬁnger area used for hand-to-mouth
transfer varies linearly from 15 cm
2 for a 2-year-old child, to 45 cm
2 at age 17, and
remains constant thereafter throughout adulthood.
Exposed skin surface area (SAtrans and SAwork)
For dermal contact, it is important to consider that much less transfer will occur
to body parts such as the arms, legs, and face that undergo less intensive surface
contact than hands. This analysis follows Superfund exposure assessment guidance,
which has established exposed skin surface areas (SA trans and SA work)a s2 8 0 0c m
2
for clothed children and 5700 cm
2 for clothed adult workers (USEPA 2004a).
Frequency of hand-to-mouth contact (FQ)
Basedonobservationsatday-carecentersandtheliterature(Michaudetal.1994),
theWTCreport(COPC2003)groupstheagecohort-speciﬁchand-to-mouthcontact
frequency (FQ) as follows: toddler child (1 to 6 yr; FQc) = 9.5 times/h; adult (≥18
yr; FQa) = 1t i m e / h .
Saliva extraction factor (SE)
The fraction transferred from skin to mouth depends on the contaminant,
mouthing duration, and other behavioral patterns. The WTC assessment used the
USEPA Ofﬁce of Pesticide Programs (OPP) default of 50%, based on pesticide
studies (COPC 2003). Michaud et al. (1994) assumed that all of the residues de-
posited on the ﬁngertips would be transferred to the mouth, twice per day. In the
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Binghamton State Ofﬁce Building post-ﬁre re-entry guideline derivation, a range
of factors was used: 0.05, 0.1, and 0.25, representing the fraction of residue on the
hand that is transferred to the mouth (Kim and Hawley 1985). For purposes of the
airport evaluation, the OPP default of 50% used in the WTC assessment was selected
as the saliva extraction factor (SE) for all ages.
Ingestion factor (IF)
To account for variability in exposure to hard and soft surfaces, the WTC assess-
ment developed a dust ingestion factor (IF) equation (COPC 2003). This equation
averagesthedifferences inexposuretohardandsoftsurfacesbytheexposuretimes.
The following generic equation is presented below without scenario-speciﬁc inputs
(Table 9 for variable identiﬁcation and characterization). This equation applies to
toddler child transit passengers as well as various airport employees and personnel:
IF

cm2
day

=

FTSHSh × ETh

hrs
day

+

FTSHSs × ETs

hrs
day

×SE×SAhand

cm2
event

× FQtrans

events
hour

Dermal factor (DF)
To account for variability in exposure to hard and soft surfaces, the WTC as-
sessment developed a dermal absorption factor (DF) equation (COPC 2003). This
equation averages the differences in exposure to hard and soft surfaces by the ex-
posure durations (Table 9 for variable identiﬁcation and characterization). As for
the ingestion factor, the following generic equation is presented without scenario-
speciﬁc inputs and is applied to toddler child transit passengers as well as various
airport employees and personnel:
DF

cm2
day

=

FTSBSh × ETh

hrs
day

+

FTSBSs × ETs

hrs
day

×SAtrans

cm2
day

×

1day
24hrs

Frequency of hand-to-eye (FQeye)
Because the eye is the most sensitive body part for exposure to HD and VX
(NRC/COT 2003), this evaluation follows the WTC model concept of hand-to-
mouth contact by developing and adding a hand-to-eye exposure route. Consider-
ation of hand-to-eye exposure is a unique feature of the SRCL model approach. A
literaturesearchwasperformedtodeterminehand-to-eyecontactfrequency(FQeye).
Sensitive populations, such as contact lens wearers, allergy sufferers, and people
with the medical condition keratoconus, were not excluded. McMonnies and Bone-
ham (2003) report that subjects without contacts and without any eye abnormality
usually lightly rub their eyes for a short time with the pads of their ﬁngers at a
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frequency of less than once per day. Subjects with kerataconus use their knuckles
and aggressively grind the eye socket with multiple, prolonged episodes each day.
Yusel et al. (2001) noted that, out of 64 subjects with vernal keratoconjunctivitis,
66% rubbed their eyes frequently (>10 times daily), 24% rubbed their eyes occa-
sionally (5 to 10 times daily), and 10% rubbed their eyes rarely (<5 times daily).
Cameron et al. (1989) questioned 44 patients who reported either frequent (>10
times/day), occasional (5 to 10 times/day) or rare (1 to 4 times/day) eye rubbing.
Korb et al. (1991) found that prolonged, forceful, multiple-knuckle eye rubbing
occurs 3 to 10 times per day in patients with kerataconus, whereas control group
frequency is less than once per day and is manifest by application of ﬁnger tips and
a brief, light rubbing. For the purposes of the present evaluation, the threshold for
“frequent” (e.g., 10 times/day) hand-to-eye rubbing reported in these studies was
used. It is also assumed that hand-to-eye contact could also occur without a rubbing
episode. Because of the deep pressure applied to the eye during a kerataconus eye-
rubbing episode and the normal moisture present around the eye, it was assumed
for the purpose of the present assessment that 100% of a contaminant on the ﬁngers
and hand would be transferred to the eye during a rubbing episode.
Eye surface area (SAeye)
Thesurface area ofthe eye (SAeye)is needed tocalculate this exposureroute.The
studies reported in the earlier assessment of hand-to-eye contact frequency (FQeye)
reportthatbotheyesareoftenrubbedatthesametime.Datafromliterature(Bozkir
etal.2003)allowedcalculationofthecombinedsurfaceareaofbotheyes(33.4cm
2).
The exposed eye surface between the upper and lower eyelids is elliptical, and the
standard formula for elliptical area is employed; the long axis estimate is 32.6 mm
(palpebral ﬁssure length); the short axis estimate is 16.3 mm (palpebral ﬁssure
height of 10.3 mm added to 3 mm each for upper and lower eyelids) (Bozkir et al.
2003).
Ocular rubbing factor (OF)
To account for variability in hand exposure to hard and soft surfaces, an ocular
rubbing factor (OF) equation was developed for the current analysis. The following
equation (see Table 9 for variable identiﬁcation and characterization) averages
differences in hand exposure to hard and soft surfaces, and consequent differences
in potential contaminant exposure to the eye:
OFtrans

cm2
day

=

[(FTSHSh × ETh) + (FTSHSs × ETs)]
×SAeyes

cm2
event

× FQeye

events
day

×

1day
24hrs

Resuspension factor (RF)
It is possible that agent may be resuspended in dust from a contaminated surface
bytheactionoffoottrafﬁcandcleaningactivities(Gomesetal.2007).Reportsofthe
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG 1992, 2002) present resuspension
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factors (relating air concentration to surface concentration) ranging from 6 × 10
−8
to 7 × 10
−4 m
−1 for multiple activities. Based on the NUREG (2002) recommenda-
tions, an intermediate resuspension factor (RF) of 1 × 10
−6 m
−1 was selected as a
representative default RF for the airport scenario analysis.
Dermal absorption factor (ABS)
Dermal absorption factor (ABS) represents the unitless fraction of potential con-
taminant that could be transferred through the skin for systemic absorption from
contaminated media. Dermal absorption factor values of 0.056 for HD and 0.022 for
VX have been used for CW agent demilitarization facility personnel estimates, while
ABS values of 0.084 for HD and 0.033 for VX have been used in calculating resi-
dential estimates (USACHPPM 1999). The residential ABS values from USACHPPM
(1999) were incorporated into the present analysis. For nerve agent VX, the ABS
value of 0.033 compares well with results of in vitro experimental absorption on
human cadaver skin samples exposed to
14C parathion, an anticholinesterase insec-
ticide considered to be a reasonable surrogate for nerve agent VX (Wester et al.
2000). Following a single exposure and a 96-h absorption period, 1.78 ± 0.41%
(e.g., 0.018) of the labeled parathion was taken up by unclothed, dry cadaver skin
samples (Wester et al. 2000).
The present analysis compared SRCL values resulting from inclusion of the ABS
value of 0.033 for a residential scenario (a protective assumption for the airport
assessment; USACHPPM 1999) versus the ABS estimate of 0.018 taken from Wester
et al. (2000). The SRCL results from both calculations equal 3.1 × 10
−4 mg/cm
2 for
the 24-h exposure duration (Tables 11 and 12).
Table 11. Estimated Sulfur Mustard and Agent VX Surface Removal
Contaminant Levels (SRCLs) for child transit passengers.
a
Transit Passenger SRCL4
b,c Transit Passenger SRCL24
b,d
Protective estimate Protective estimate
(mg/cm2 surface, (mg/cm2 surface,
CWA continuous exposure) continuous exposure)
Sulfur mustard (HD) 1.77 × 10−3 2.95 × 10−4
VX 1.85 × 10−3 3.08 × 10−4
aChemical formulae: HD, C4H8Cl2S; VX, C11H26NO2PS.
bThe “child passenger” estimate employs toddler child-speciﬁc information regarding object
mouthing behavior and dermal contact with surfaces, and is thus a protective estimate for
adult transit passengers. Passenger SRCL estimates incorporate contaminant transfer from
hard and soft surfaces to the eye, skin, and mouth (incidental ingestion) as well as potential
particle inhalation arising from resuspension.
cSRCL4 assumes average exposure dwell time of 4 continuous h (incorporates inhalation
toxicity value for exposure durations ≤8h ) .
dSRCL24 assumes maximal exposure dwell time of 24 continuous h (incorporates inhalation
toxicity value for exposure durations >8hb u t≤24 h).
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Table 12. Estimated Sulfur Mustard and Agent VX Surface Removal
Contaminant Levels (SRCLs) for adult airport employees and
personnel.
a
Airport Employee/Personnel Airport Employee/Personnel
SRCL8
b,c SRCL12
b,d
Protective estimate Protective estimate
(mg/cm2 surface, (mg/cm2 surface,
CWA continuous exposure) continuous exposure)
Sulfur mustard (HD) 8.65 × 10−3 5.77 × 10−3
VX 9.56 × 10−3 6.33 × 10−3
aChemical formulae: HD, C4H8Cl2S; VX, C11H26NO2PS.
bAirport employee estimate includes various airport employees and personnel (all of whom
are restrained from entering the facility until after the agent source is removed or
neutralized, any decontamination process is completed, and monitoring has characterized
workspace atmospheres as suitable for reoccupancy). Airport employee and personnel SRCL
estimates incorporate contaminant transfer from hard and soft surfaces to the eye, skin, and
mouth (incidental ingestion) as well as potential particle inhalation due to resuspension.
cSRCL8 assumes average exposure time (shift) of 8 continuous h (incorporates inhalation
toxicity value for exposure durations ≤8h ) .
dSRCL12 assumes maximal exposure time (shift) of 12 continuous h (incorporates
inhalation toxicity value for exposure durations >8hb u t≤24 h).
Body weight (BW)
Body weights (BWs) of 70 kg and 15 kg were assumed for adults and children,
respectively (USEPA 2004a).
Gastrointestinal absorption factor (GIABS)
Gastrointestinal absorption factors (GIABSs) are commonly used to convert oral
toxicity values into dermal toxicity values because dermal toxicity values are seldom
available;suchconversionsareconsideredprotective.TheGIABSistheunitlessfrac-
tion of contaminant absorbed in the gastrointestinal tract. When applied to dermal
toxicity estimates, use of the GIABS maximizes the dermal absorption estimate by
assuming that GI tract and skin absorption are equal for a given compound. The
following equation from USEPA (2004a) illustrates how to convert an oral RfD to a
dermal RfD. GIABS values of 1 were used for both HD and VX because chemical-
speciﬁc values were not available; this is a highly protective assumption.
RfDdermal = RfDoral × GIABS
SRCL Results for Agents HD and VX
Summarized in Tables 11 and 12 are HD and VX results for the assumed average
and maximum (24-h) exposure times for a child transit passenger and adult airport
employees and personnel, respectively. For any given airport population and dwell
time evaluated, there is little nominal difference between the estimated SRCLs for
agents HD and VX, despite the large differences in toxicity values included in the
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011 97A. Watson et al.
calculation (Tables 11 and 12). This “ﬂattening” of compound-speciﬁc differences
is a result of the choice of values selected to characterize the fraction transferred
from surfaces to skin of the hand or body in the equations employed. Values se-
lected for nerve agent VX estimation are those for the organophosphate insecticide
Malathion
R  , being considered here as a surrogate for nerve agent VX due to pre-
viously identiﬁed similarities in the physical characteristics of vapor pressure and
Henry’s Law Constants (see earlier characterization of FTSHS) (NRC/COT 2003;
DaubertandDanner1989;FendingerandGlotfelty1990).Itisthusreasonabletoap-
ply Malathion
R  -speciﬁc fractions (transfer-to-hand fraction of 0.0018 and 0.0152 for
vinyl ﬂooring and carpets, respectively; COPC 2003) for use in VX characterization
during the current evaluation.
In contrast, those skin transfer values employed for sulfur mustard are standard
defaults originally developed for particle transfer (10% for carpets, and 50% for
hard surfaces such as vinyl) as recommended by COPC (2003), and from hand-
press experiments by Rodes et al. (2001). The use of default skin transfer values
for HD is due to the unavailability of HD-speciﬁc (or reasonable surrogate-speciﬁc)
hard- and soft-surface skin-transfer data for this vesicant agent; this is a signiﬁcant
data gap. The chemical and physical properties of sulfur mustard agent HD [Watson
et al. (2011, this issue), Table 2] indicate that actual skin transfer values from hard
and soft surfaces would be less than the default values necessarily employed in the
present estimation. As a consequence, the SRCL estimates presented in Tables 11
and 12 for HD are considered highly protective.
This analysis indicates that the most protective approach for all examined ex-
posure durations and populations would be to select the compound-speciﬁc 24-h
SRCLestimatesforthetransitpassengerchildreceptorforapplicationascompound-
speciﬁc screening criteria for persistent CWAs.
SRCL Results for Degradation Products of HD and VX
Compound-speciﬁc parameters and toxicity values were applied in a similar man-
ner to estimate SRCL values for degradation products of HD and VX. Results are
summarized in Table 13 for the child transit passenger, which represents the most
susceptible subpopulation evaluated in the surface contact assessment.
This analysis indicates that the most protective approach for all examined expo-
suredurationsandpopulationswouldbetoselectthecompound-speciﬁc24-hSRCL
estimates for the transit passenger child receptor for application as compound-
speciﬁc screening criteria for these key degradation products of persistent
CWAs.
Exposure Time Fraction and Route-Speciﬁc Relative Contribution
The World Trade Center (WTC) Indoor Assessment (COPC 2003) model incor-
poratesanexposuretimefractionforthedermalexposureroute,andthoseportions
of the WTC model were followed for the current analysis. The WTC model math-
ematically assumes that, once contact with a contaminated surface is terminated,
exposure also terminates. Other USEPA models of dermal exposure assume that a
contaminant resides in a medium such as soil, with adherence of the medium to the
skin throughout the day with continuing exposure even when the receptor is not at
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Table 13. Estimated HD and VX Degradation Product Surface Removal
Contaminant Levels (SRCLs) for child transit passengers.
a
Transit Passenger Transit Passenger
SRCL4
b,c SRCL24
b,d
Protective estimate Protective estimate
(mg/cm2 surface, (mg/cm2 surface,
CWA Degradation Product continuous exposure) continuous exposure)
TDG (thiodiglycol) 1.06 × 102 1.77 × 101
EMPA (ethyl methylphosphonic acid) 7.08 1.18
MPA (methyl phosphonic acid) 5.06 8.44 × 10−1
EA2192 1.89 × 10−3 3.15 × 10−4
aChemical formulae: TDG, C4H10O2S; EMPA, C3H9O3P; MPA, CH5O3P; EA2192,
C9H22NO2PS.
bThe “child passenger” estimate employs child-speciﬁc information regarding object
mouthing behavior and dermal contact with surfaces, and is thus a protective estimate for
adult transit passengers. Passenger SRCL estimates incorporate contaminant transfer from
hard and soft surfaces to the eye, skin, and mouth (incidental ingestion), as well as potential
particle inhalation due to resuspension from surfaces.
cSRCL4 assumes average exposure dwell time of 4 continuous h (incorporates inhalation
toxicity value for exposure durations ≤8h ) .
dSRCL24 assumes maximal exposure dwell time of 24 continuous h (incorporates inhalation
toxicity value for exposure durations >8hb u t≤24 h).
the original exposure site. USEPA (2004a) currently does not address more reﬁned
approaches for indoor surfaces [(as used in the WTC report of COPC (2003) and
the present analysis]. The airport scenario considers direct contact with a surface
residue and does not assume the presence of a delivery medium.
The relative contribution of each exposure route (e.g., ingestion, ocular, der-
mal skin, and resuspension inhalation) to the total SRCL has been characterized
by calculating each route-speciﬁc component of the SRCL equation. The esti-
mated route-speciﬁc relative contributions for transit passengers and various air-
port employees and personnel potentially exposed to HD or VX are summarized in
Tables14and15.TherelativecontributionforHDandVXdegradationproductsfor
the child transit passenger population is summarized in Table 16. For veriﬁcation
purposes, the present analysis incorporates a stochastic model approach employed
by CalEPA (Salocks 2007, 2008, 2009).
For child transit passengers, the largest estimated component of the compos-
ite transit passenger average and maximum VX (and HD) SRCL is that provided
by indirect (incidental, nondietary) ingestion (approximately 80%) due to object
mouthing behavior. Direct eye exposure accounts for 15 to 16%, with the bulk of the
remainder provided by direct dermal. The contribution of resuspension inhalation
is much less than 1% for this population.
For VX, the largest estimated component of the composite airport personnel and
employee average and maximum VX SRCL is that provided by indirect (incidental,
nondietary) ingestion (57%), whereas direct eye exposure accounts for 35%; the
remainder is comprised of direct dermal (skin) exposure (6.6%) and resuspension
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Table 14. Estimated contribution of each exposure route to Sulfur Mustard and
Agent VX SRCLs for child transit passengers.
a
Transit passenger Transit passenger
CWA 4-h dwell time (%) 24-h dwell time (%)
Sulfur mustard (HD) Ingestion: 79.1 Ingestion: 79.1
Eye: 15.5 Eye: 15.5
Dermal skin: 5.4 Dermal skin: 5.4
Resuspension inhalation: <1 Resuspension inhalation: <1
VX Ingestion: 81.7 Ingestion: 81.8
Eye: 16.0 Eye: 16.0
Dermal skin: 2.2 Dermal skin: 2.2
Resuspension inhalation: 0.14 Resuspension inhalation: 0.07
aChemical formulae: HD, C4H8Cl2S; VX, C11H26NO2PS.
inhalation (approximately 1%). Estimates for HD are similar to those of VX for
reasons outlined above.
In general, estimated relative contributions for HD and VX degradation products
mirror those for the parent compound, except for EA 2192, which is not absorbed
through the skin and is not an inhalation hazard (Michel et al. 1962). The resuspen-
sion inhalation component for EA 2192 is minimal.
SRCL Evaluation
Although the logic and assumptions of COPC (2003) were largely employed in
the present analysis, a number of reﬁnements were added to more closely simulate
conditions expected in a transportation hub that has been the target of a deliberate
CWA or TIC release. These reﬁnements include:
Table 15. Estimated contribution of each exposure route to Sulfur Mustard and
Agent VX SRCLs for adult airport employees and personnel.
a
Airport employee/ Airport employee/
CWA personnel 8-h workshift (%) personnel 12-h workshift (%)
Sulfur mustard (HD) Ingestion: 52.2 Ingestion: 52.3
Eye: 32.3 Eye: 32.3
Dermal skin: 15.5 Dermal skin: 15.4
Resuspension inhalation: <1 Resuspension inhalation: <1
VX Ingestion: 57.2 Ingestion: 56.9
Eye: 35.4 Eye: 35.1
Dermal skin: 6.6 Dermal skin: 6.6
Resuspension inhalation: 0.74 Resuspension inhalation: 1.4
aChemical formulae: HD, C4H8Cl2S; VX, C11H26NO2PS.
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Table 16. Estimated contribution of each exposure route to Degradation
Product SRCLs (mg/cm
2 of surface) for child transit passengers.
a
CWA Degradation Transit Passenger, Transit Passenger,
Product 4-h dwell time (%) 24-h dwell time (%)
TDG (thiodiglycol) Ingestion: 83.0 Ingestion: 83.1
Eye: 16.2 Eye: 16.2
Dermal skin: 0.6 Dermal skin: 0.6
Resuspension inhalation: <1 Resuspension inhalation: <1
EMPA (ethyl Ingestion: 79.0 Ingestion: 79.1
methylphosphonic Eye: 15.4 Eye: 15.4
acid) Dermal skin: 5.43 Dermal skin: 5.44
Resuspension inhalation: <1 Resuspension inhalation: <1
MPA (methyl Ingestion: 79.0 Ingestion: 79.1
phosphonic acid) Eye: 15.4 Eye: 15.4
Dermal skin: 5.43 Dermal skin: 5.44
Resuspension inhalation: <1 Resuspension inhalation: <1
EA 2192 Ingestion: 83.7 Ingestion: 83.7
Eye: 16.3 Eye: 16.3
Dermal skin: NAb Dermal skin: NAb
Resuspension inhalation: NAb Resuspension inhalation: NAb
aChemical formulae: TDG, C4H10O2S; EMPA, C3H9O3P; MPA, CH5O3P; EA2192,
C9H22NO2PS.
bEA 2192 is a solid, is not an inhalation hazard, and is not absorbed through the skin in
aqueous or alcohol solutions (Michel et al. 1962).
• Exposure duration (ED) and exposure frequency (EF) have been developed
for transit passengers and airport personnel/employees based on agent degra-
dation analysis from Watson et al. (2011, this issue) characterizing surfaces in
the post-decontamination environment. This method more accurately reﬂects
the expected, acute nature of potential post-decontamination exposures from
residual CWAs or TICs in the speciﬁc airport-release scenario under considera-
tion (e.g., one-time only release with passenger and airport personnel re-entry
only after release device is removed and/or neutralized, decontamination is
complete, and monitoring has characterized atmospheres and surfaces as suit-
able for re-occupancy). Traditional exposure assessments are based on human
activity patterns and not the likely presence of contamination (USEPA 1991).
However, there is precedence to include dissipation terms in risk calculations
for dust on surfaces, as in the WTC assessment (COPC 2003), and evaluations
of radioactive decay. In the case of the present analysis, ED and EF are based
on the rapid and well-characterized degradation reactions taking place during
the decontamination phase (Watson et al. 2011, this issue;Y a n get al. 1994;
Yang 1999; Talmage et al. 2007a,b; others). Hence, the SRCL equations do not
include a decay rate variable.
• Addition of hand-to-eye exposure estimates because the eye is considered the
most susceptible target organ for sulfur mustard or nerve agent exposures.
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• Addition of a resuspension factor for dust inhalation arising from foot trafﬁc
or cleaning activities.
• Development of compound-speciﬁc, subchronic oral RfD estimates (7 × 10
−5
mg HD/kg/day; 2 × 10
−6 mg VX/kg/day) by deletion of the subchronic-to-
chronicuncertaintyfactorpreviouslyincorporatedintochronicRfDestimation
(Opresko et al. 1998).
• Use of inhalation toxicity values equivalent to estimated airborne re-entry
screening guidelines (Table 2).
In addition, information characterizing transit passenger dwell time in airport ter-
minals and based on recent traveler interviews conducted at LAX, was incorporated
intothetransitpassengerestimates (Table11).Theairportemployee andpersonnel
estimates incorporate standard work shifts of 8 and 12 h (Table 12).
This evaluation considers that the most protective estimation for screening sur-
facespriortore-entrybythepublic(includingvariousairportemployeesandperson-
nel) is to apply SRCL estimations developed for the toddler child transit passenger.
This recommendation is based on the fact that a toddler represents the population
group for which hand-to-mouth and body-skin exposure is maximized because of
frequent object mouthing activities and skin contact with surfaces. Furthermore,
because the most reliable values for the FTSHS parameter (fraction transferred
from surface to hand skin) (and by extension, the FTSBS body skin parameter) is
available for VX, the SRCL estimates for VX are more reliable than those for HD,
and are thus preferable. Additional protection is provided by selecting the small-
est SRCL estimate for VX—that estimated for 24-h continuous exposure duration
(Table 11).
Surface Removal Contaminant Levels (SRCLs) can be calculated or modiﬁed
quickly following the equations presented in this analysis and use of spreadsheets
or hand calculations. This simplicity offers great utility in the event of a terrorist
attack. However, to test the validity of the deterministic approach, comparison to a
model requiring greater computing power was desired. For veriﬁcation purposes, a
stochasticmodelapproachemployedbyCalEPA(Salocks2007,2008,2009)wascom-
pared to the present analysis. The Stochastic Human Exposure and Dose Simulation
Model for Multimedia, Multipathway Chemicals (SHEDS; ver 3) was used by CalEPA
to assess children’s exposure to methamphetamine residues on surfaces (Stallings
et al. 2008; Zartarian et al. 2008); version 3 has been the most current edition avail-
able for investigative use at the time of the present analysis.
The SHEDS probabilistic model was developed by the USEPA National Exposure
Research Laboratory and estimates a total absorbed dose (mg/kg-day) for a known
surface concentration by incorporating inputs from non-dietary ingestion (hand-
to-mouth, object-to-mouth), inhalation and dermal contact time-series exposures
for speciﬁed cohorts. For the present analysis, the California methamphetamine
estimates (Salocks 2007, 2008, 2009) were repeated using the SHEDS model. Once
the model had been veriﬁed, the present analysis evaluated LAX-speciﬁc exposure
parameters (see Tables 9 and 10, and accompanying text) as well as compound-
speciﬁc chemical and physical parameters. For nerve agent VX, the SHEDS model
estimated a surface concentration guideline of 0.1 ug VX/cm
2 for the child transit
passenger and 24-h contact exposure duration; this result was within a factor of 3
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of the guideline value for the same receptor and contact exposure duration (0.3
ug VX/cm
2, Table 11) estimated by means of the deterministic SRCL approach
used in this present analysis. Note that the SRCL approach represents an expansion
from SHEDs in that SRCL also considers input from ocular (hand-to-eye) exposure.
The authors believe that the deterministic approach to calculating SRCLs com-
pares favorably with results obtained from application of the SHEDS probabilistic
model.
According to the SHEDS website (http://www.epa.gov/heasd/products/sheds
multimedia/sheds mm.html), development of SHEDS-Multimedia version 4 is on-
going at this writing (August 2010); when ready, Version 4 will allow for cumulative
(multi-chemical) or aggregate (single chemical) assessments and combine residen-
tial and dietary modules. A USEPA Science Advisory Panel (SAP) review of SHEDS-
Multimedia version 4 occurred in July 2010; at present, the Version 4 model release
date has not been announced.
An evaluation of the protective nature of the VX SRCL can be performed by
comparisons with published estimates of VX dermal toxicity (human LD50 of 4 µg
VX/cm
2 when applied as undiluted agent directly to skin and without considering
transfer losses that occur during skin contact with surfaces; Wester et al. 2000) and
calculation of the amount of VX potentially transferred to the skin after contact with
asurfacecontaminatedbythe24-htoddlertransitpassengerSRCLof3.08×10
−4mg
VX/cm
2 (0.3 µgV X / c m
2). Application of the estimated FTSBS for VX (0.0009 for
vinyl and 0.0076 for carpet; Table 9) results in an estimated VX transfer to body skin
of between 2.8 × 10
−4 µgV X / c m
2 to 2.3 × 10
−3 µgV X / c m
2. This range represents a
difference of approximately 10
3 to 10
4 less than the published human dermal LD50
of 4 µgV X / c m
2 for VX (Wester et al. 2000). It is noted that estimates of transfer to
the skin of the hand are incorporated into the above FTSBS consideration.
These ratios are protective when compared with other toxicological information
forVX,suchasthedifferencebetween ratthresholdlethality(1-hthresholdlethality
in female rats is 0.50 mg VX/m
3,o r5 0 0µgV X / c m
3) and reversible EC50 for miosis
(considered a nonadverse effect) (1-h miosis EC50 in female SD rats is 0.002 mg
VX/m
3,or2µgVX/cm
3;Bentonetal.2005,2006a,b,2007).Thedifferencebetween
no-adverse effect (EC50 miosis) and threshold lethality in SD rats is a factor of 10
2;
thus, the greater difference of 10
3 to 10
4 exhibited by the difference between the
toddlertransitpassengerSRCLandestimatedhumandermalLD50 isanindicationof
theprotectivenatureoftheSRCLestimateforVX.AlthoughtheBentonetal.(2005,
2006a,b, 2007) data are for VX vapor exposure, relative ratios between lethality and
no adverse effect are considered comparable given the same mechanism of toxicity;
for example, anticholinesterase activity, is the source of toxic response in both cases.
CONCLUSIONS
If a chemical terrorist incident should occur tomorrow, it is important to have
an immediate set of appropriate and reasonable clearance goals from which to be-
gin recovery. Exposure guidance and screening levels for use in chemical terrorist
remediation decision-making have been developed in a national case study spon-
sored by the Department of Homeland Security in partnership with the Bradley
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International Terminal (TBIT) at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX; Los
Angeles, CA). Part II of the assessment (presented here) documents development
of human-health based multipathway decision criteria. Exposure routes evaluated
include direct ocular vapor and vapor inhalation, percutaneous vapor, surface
contact, hand-to-eye, hand-to-mouth, non-dietary and dietary ingestion and resus-
pension inhalation (Figure 3 and Tables 1–16). The scenario compounds under
consideration are the chemical warfare agent (CWA) nerve agents tabun (GA),
sarin (GB), soman (GD), cyclosarin (GF), and VX as well as the vesicant agent sulfur
mustard (HD); and the toxic industrial compounds (TIC) phosgene (CG), hydro-
gen cyanide (AC), and cyanogen chloride (CK). Exposure guidelines for CW agent
degradation products of interest are also developed and provided.
This article presents ﬁrst-time, open-literature documentation of multi-pathway
andhealth-based remediation exposureguidelinesforallnine ofthesechemical ter-
rorist threat compounds and their degradation products. These guidelines are suit-
able for application to various civilian populations, and are both health-protective
and reasonable for use as clearance decision criteria during remediation of a chem-
ical terrorist event within a major domestic transportation hub. Personal protective
equipment guidelines for decontamination personnel are also identiﬁed.
Emphasis is placed on compound-speciﬁc exposure guidelines that already exist,
arepublishedandaccessibletothepublic,haveundergonecrediblepeerandpublic
review, are health-based and protective, and have demonstrated utility in use and
practice.Selectionofcompound-speciﬁccriticaleffectsusedaspoint(s)ofdeparture
for this analysis focuses on reversible, non-adverse (often local) effects that exhibit
well-deﬁned dose response, such as EC50 for miosis in a susceptible gender following
nerve agent vapor exposure. With application of uncertainty factors, the resulting
exposure guidance concentrations are protective for all segments of the general
population, including susceptible subpopulations. When published low-level expo-
sure guidelines were not available or suitable (e.g., for phosgene, hydrogen cyanide,
cyanogen chloride) application of standard risk assessment methods resulted in
appropriate guidance values.
Because of their recognized scientiﬁc credibility and expanding uses in domestic
preparedness planning by affected communities as well as Federal and state author-
ities, the Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL) concentrations published by the
Committee on Toxicology of the National Research Council are considered by this
analysisasprotective,appropriateandusefulformakingsite-accessre-entrydetermi-
nationsforthetravelingpublic,airportpersonnel,andvendors.Thisanalysisfurther
considers application of the mildest effect tier (AEGL-1) to be appropriate, and ap-
plication of the 8-h AEGL-1 concentrations (the lowest values) as reasonable criteria
for all transit passenger stay times ≤8 h as well as for airport personnel and vendors
(Table 2). Selecting the minimal exposure concentrations developed for assumed
8-h exposure durations is a highly protective assumption for LAX transit passengers
given the one-time only release scenario and the fact that most passengers spend
≤4 h in the most heavily used LAX terminals. It is acknowledged that use of any
given dwell (“stay”) time assumption may be airport-speciﬁc; nevertheless, the 8-h
continuous-exposure duration is considered protective for post-decontamination
applications. To address those rare situations where public dwell times may be >8h
but <24 h, alternative clearance goals are derived from standard time-extrapolation
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protocols, and provide additional ﬂexibility to decision-makers. The vapor expo-
sure guidance range provided in Table 2 represents both reasonable maximum and
alternative re-entry screening guidelines.
Given previous minimal guidance for surface contact exposures to the airport
threat compounds, this analysis develops a novel and deterministic approach to
estimate non-adverse surface residue concentrations for the persistent nerve agent
VX, the persistent vesicant agent HD and degradation products of concern. Unlike
other surface assessments, this analysis considers hand-to-eye exposure estimates as
well as a resuspension factor for dust inhalation arising from foot trafﬁc or cleaning
activities. Population exposure assessment determined that toddlers are the most
susceptible subpopulation for surface contact exposure due to object-mouthing and
other age-speciﬁc behaviors favoring transfer from surfaces; the resulting Surface
Removal Contaminant Levels (SRCLs; in mg/cm
2 for CWAs)(see Tables 11–13) are
thus protective for adults. Results compare well with those of the SHEDS probability
model developed by the USEPA National Exposure Research Laboratory for con-
taminated surfaces, and are consistent with logic employed by CalEPA in assessing
children’s exposure to methamphetamine residues on surfaces of buildings used
as clandestine production facilities. Compound-speciﬁc SRCLs can be calculated
or modiﬁed quickly following application of the equations (Figures 1 and 2) and
input parameters (Tables 9–10) presented in this analysis, with use of spreadsheets
or hand calculations. This simplicity offers great utility in the event of a terrorist
attack.
Some assumptions required to characterize SRCL exposure parameters would
be improved by means of compound-speciﬁc testing; the most signiﬁcant are those
characterizing the fraction transferred from surface to skin of the hand (FTSHS)
or body (FTSBS). Since the authors could locate no HD-speciﬁc skin transfer data
from “hard” or “soft” surfaces, FTSHS and FTSBS values utilized for sulfur mustard
are necessarily standard USEPA defaults for hard and soft surfaces. Examination
of the chemical and physical properties of HD indicates that such default transfer
values are over-estimates.
It is acknowledged that relevant work is ongoing in many ﬁelds that will con-
tinue to inform future evolution of clearance guidelines. Nevertheless, Tables 17–19
summarize protective clearance goals for the nine threat compounds and their
principal degradation products as developed during the current analyses and rec-
ommended for application to the airport remediation scenario. These tables are
intended to serve as an aid to decision-makers for pre-planning, and for actual use
should a similar incident occur in the future. By providing rationale for reasonable
and scientiﬁcally supported procedures and health-based criteria, this analysis pro-
vides decision-makers with an efﬁcient and effective approach as well as ﬂexibility
by which to weigh numerous judgments (decontamination personnel safety, public
health, time, funds, resources, public perception, and other concerns) required to
establish clearance guidelines for remediating airport facilities in which hazardous
chemical release has occurred.
Thisstudy’sﬁndingsarenotonlycrucialtothedevelopmentofpreplanninggoals
for remediation and release of airport terminals in the event of chemical terrorist
attack, but are also applicable to other transportation hubs such as bus, train, ferry,
and metro terminals.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABS dermal absorption factor
AC hydrogen cyanide; NATO code
ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AChE Acetylcholinesterase
AEGLs Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association
ATP adenosine triphosphate
ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
BAL bronchioalveolar lavage
BAST Board on Army Science and Technology (of the National Research
Council)
BuChE butyrylcholinesterase
BW body weight
CalEPA California Environmental Protection Agency
CAM Center for Airport Management
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the DHHS
CF conversion factor
CG phosgene; NATO code
CK cyanogen chloride; NATO code
COT Committee on Toxicology of the National Research Council
COPC Contaminants of Potential Concern
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program; joint
FEMA/DA organization
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CSM conceptual site model
CW chemical warfare
CWA chemical warfare agent
DA U.S. Department of the Army
DABT Diplomate, American Board of Toxicology
DF dermal factor
DHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EA2192 S-(diisopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonothioic acid,
C9H22NPO2S
EC50 median Effective Concentration
ED exposure duration
EF exposure frequency
EMPA ethyl methylphosphonic acid
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidance
ERSH-DB Emergency Response Safety and Health Database of the NIOSH
ET exposure time
FTSBS fraction transferred from surface to body skin
FTSHS fraction transferred from surface to hand skin
FNE ﬁrst noticeable effect
FQ frequency of hand-to-mouth contact
FQeye frequency of hand-to-eye contact
GA nerve agent tabun; NATO code
GB nerve agent sarin; NATO code
GD nerve agent soman; NATO code
GF nerve agent cyclosarin; NATO code
GI gastrointestinal
GIABS gastrointestinal absorption factor
HBESL Health-Based Environmental Screening Levels
HD vesicant agent distilled sulfur mustard; NATO code
HHMSSL Human Health Medium-Speciﬁc Screening Levels
IDLH immediately dangerous to life or health
IF ingestion factor
IMPA isopropyl methylphosphonic acid
IRIS Integrated Risk Information System of the USEPA
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos NM
LAWA Los Angeles World Airports
LAX Los Angeles International Airport
LD50 median Lethal Dose (50%)
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA
LOAEL lowest adverse effect level
MIST Man-In-Simulant Test Program (U.S. Dept of Army)
MPA methyl phosphonic acid; CH5O3P
MRL minimal risk level
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NAC National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
(USEPA)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NOAEL no observable effect level
NRC National Research Council
NTP National Toxicology Program
NRT National Response Team
NUREG U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OASA Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
OEHHA Ofﬁce of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment of the CalEPA
OF ocular rubbing factor
OPP Ofﬁce of Pesticide Programs (USEPA)
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge TN
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OTSG Ofﬁce of the Surgeon General (U.S. Dept of the Army)
PAL Provisional Advisory Levels (USEPA)
PNNL Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory, Richland WA
PPE personal protective equipment
PRG Preliminary Remediation Goal (USEPA)
RBC Risk-Based Concentration (USEPA)
RBC-ChE red blood cell cholinesterase
RME reasonable maximum exposure
RF resuspension factor
RfC reference concentration
RfD oral reference dose
RfDe estimated oral reference dose
RSLs Regional Screening Levels of the USEPA
SAeye surface area of eyes
SAhand surface area of hand
SAtrans exposed skin surface area of clothed children
SAwork exposed skin surface area of clothed airport personnel
SAP Science Advisory Panel (USEPA)
SD Sprague-Dawley (rat strain)
SE saliva extraction factor
SHEDS Stochastic Human Exposure and Dose Simulation model (USEPA)
SNL Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque NM
SRCL surface removal contaminant levels
STEL short-term exposure limit
SVFUDS Spring Valley Formerly Used Defense Site
TBIT The Bradley International Terminal of the LA International Airport
TDG thiodiglycol
THQ toxic hazard quotient
TIC toxic industrial compounds
UFA interspecies uncertainty factor
UFH intraspecies uncertainty factor
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USACHPPM U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
USEPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
VX nerve agent; NATO code
WTC World Trade Center
WWI World War I
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